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Stalin’s Englishman: the lives of Guy Burgess, based on over thirty years of research in 
dozens of archives in Britain, America, Australia, Russia, France and Switzerland as well as 
over a hundred interviews – many with people who had never spoken before – was the first  
proper biography of the Cambridge spy. It produced a very different account of the dynamics 
of the Cambridge Spies, was critically acclaimed on both sides of the Atlantic and won the 
premier US and UK intelligence book prize in 2016. 
 
Its importance lay not only in giving the first full account of the missing member of the 
Cambridge Spy Ring but showing Burgess was a far more important member – possibly the 
most important – than has hitherto been realised. It looked at the British cover up that 
continues to this day and attempted to assess the impact of Burgess’s spying on twentieth 
century history and the damage it did to Anglo-American relations and trust in the ‘British 
Establishment’. The book also revealed an unknown atomic spy Wilfrid Mann and raised 
wider questions about the use of biography to humanise intelligence history and the 
difficulties of researching intelligence history. 
 
This thesis aims to expand on the book drawing on subsequent research. First, to assess how 
my biographical research into Guy Burgess has transformed our understanding of the 
Cambridge spy ring as a whole and of Burgess's relative importance within it. Secondly to 
consider the opportunities provided by a biographical approach when writing intelligence 
history. Third to look at the challenges of writing intelligence biography and  what techniques  
and sources  - oral testimony as much as archival research - can be used and fourth to assess 
the importance of Burgess and what damage he caused thereby setting him in the wider 
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The Cambridge Spy Ring – a group of Cambridge students recruited to spy for the Soviet 
Union in the 1930s – has excited public interest since its existence was revealed with the 
defection of two, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, in May 1951.1 A huge literature has 
grown up around them with several general accounts.2 The member who has perhaps 
generated most interest has been Kim Philby, hitherto regarded as the most important of the 
‘Ring of Five’.3   The other members Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross 
have also had several books on them.4 The fifth member of the Ring, Guy Burgess, has been 
less well-covered, probably because he disappeared to Russia in 1951, was the first to die in 
1963 and was assumed to have been unimportant. Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy 
Burgess5 was therefore the first authoritative life of Burgess.  
                                                            
1 The first books, often based on newspaper reports, appeared almost immediately, most 
notably Cyril Connolly The Missing Diplomats (London: Queen Anne Press, 1952) and John 
Mather and Donald Seaman,  The Great Spy Scandal  (London: Daily Express, 1955). 
2 John Fisher, Burgess and Maclean (London: Robert Hale,1977);  Andrew Boyle , The 
Climate of Treason (London: Hutchinson,1979); Andrew Sinclair, The Red and the Blue: 
Intelligence, Treason and the Universities (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1986); Verne 
Newton, Butcher’s Embrace: Philby Conspirators in Washington (London: Little Brown, 
1991); John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusion (London: Century,1993); Yuri Modin, 
My Five Cambridge Friends (London: Headline,1994);  Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The 
Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (London: Collins,1998);  
SJ Hamrick, Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess  
(London: Yale,2004); Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, Triplex: Secrets from the Cambridge 
Spies (London: Yale, 1998); Richard Davenport-Hines, Enemies Within: Communists, the 
Cambridge Spies and the Making of Modern Britain (London: Collins, 2018). 
3 Books on Philby include Eleanor Philby, Kim Philby: The Spy I Loved (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1968); Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, Philby: The Long Road to Moscow 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1973);  Philip Knightley, Philby: The Life and Views of the KGB 
Masterspy (London: Andre Deutsch, 1988); Genrikh Borovik and Philip Knightley (eds), The 
Philby Files (London: Little Brown,1994); Rufina Philby with Hayden Peake and Mikhail 
Lyubimov, The Private Life of Kim Philby (Illinois: Fromm, 2000);  Edward Harrison , The 
Young Kim Philby: Soviet Spy and British Intelligence Officer (Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press, 2012); Ben McIntyre, A Spy Among Friends (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) Tim Milne, 
Kim Philby: The Unknown Story of the KGB’s Master Spy (London: Biteback, 2014).  
4  Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman, Conspiracy of Silence: The Secret Life of Anthony 
Blunt (London: Grafton,1986); John Costello, Mask of Treachery: The First Documented 
Dossier on Blunt, MI5 and Soviet Subversion (London: Collins, 1988); Miranda Carter, 
Anthony Blunt: His Lives (London: Macmillan, 2001); Geoffrey Hoare, The Missing 
Macleans (London: Cassell, 1955); Robert Cecil, A Divided Life: A Biography of Donald 
Maclean (London: Bodley Head, 1988);  Michael Holzman, Donald and Melinda Maclean: 
Idealism and Espionage (New York: Chelmsford Press, 2014); Roland Philipps, A Spy Called 
Orphan (London: Bodley Head, 2018);  John Cairncross, The Enigma Spy (London: Century, 
1997) and Geoff Andrews,  John Cairncross (London: IB Tauris, 2018). 
5 Andrew Lownie, Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess (London: Hodder, 2015 
published in an updated version by Hodder and St Martin’s Press in 2016). David Leitch, Guy 
 
Based on over thirty years of research in dozens of archives in Britain, America, Australia, 
Russia, France and Switzerland as well as over a hundred interviews – many with people who 
had never spoken before – Stalin’s Englishman produced a very different account of the 
dynamics of the Cambridge Spies and won the premier UK and US intelligence book prize in 
2016.  Its importance lay not only in giving the first full account of the missing member of 
the Cambridge Spy Ring but showing Burgess was a far more important member – possibly 
the most important – than has hitherto been realised. It looked at the British cover up that 
continues to this day and attempted to assess the impact of Burgess’s spying on twentieth 
century history and the damage it did to Anglo-American relations and trust in the ‘British 
Establishment’. The book also revealed an unknown atomic spy Wilfrid Mann and raised 
wider questions about the use of biography to humanise intelligence history and the 
difficulties of researching intelligence history. 
 
This thesis, based on Stalin’s Englishman,     aims to expand on the book drawing on 
subsequent research. First, to assess how my biographical research into Burgess has 
transformed our understanding of the Cambridge spy ring as a whole and of Burgess's 
relative importance within it. Secondly to consider the opportunities provided by a 
biographical approach when writing intelligence history. Third to look at the challenges of 
writing intelligence biography and  what techniques  and sources  - oral testimony as much as 
archival research - can be used and fourthly to assess the importance of Burgess and what 
damage he caused thereby setting him in the wider context of the Cold War and other 










The growth of intelligence history 
 
 
Intelligence biographies tend to be part of a subgenre of intelligence titles, many of them 
written by non-academics and once dismissed as from ‘the airport bookstall school of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Burgess, (Harpenden: Lennard Publishing, 1999) was never published. Michael Holzman, 
Guy Burgess: Revolutionary in an Old School Tie, (New York: Chelmsford Press, 2013) was 
self-published and critically reviewed. See Nigel West, “A Life Still Unexplained,”   
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26:2 (2013), pp 421-
426,  Stewart Purvis and Jeff Hulbert, Guy Burgess: The Spy Who Knew Everyone, (London: 
Biteback, 2016)  published after Stalin’s Englishman made good use of the 400 files released 
in October 2015 though it missed much of significance and suffered from letting the files 
dictate the story rather than using them to reinforce other research - a common mistake by 
intelligence historians. 
 
intelligence history’.6 There is however no reason why intelligence biographies should not 
combine scholarly archival research with readability, that they should make intelligence 
accessible to a more general reader and still make a contribution to intelligence studies.  
 
It is worth tracing how the two distinct intelligence cultures of the ‘popular’ or ‘journalistic’ 
merged with the ‘academic’. There has always been an interest in spy books but the 
fascination was stimulated during the1960s,  Christopher Moran argues ‘following a string of 
high-profile fiascos (including the U-2 spy plane incident in May 1960, the abortive Bay of 
Pigs invasion in April 1961, the John Vassall spy case in 1962, and the Profumo Affair in 
1963’.7 
 
Then during the 1970s there were a series of insider memoirs which included John 
Masterman’s account of the Double-Cross network8 and Fred Winterbotham’s book on 
Ultra.9 These books,which highlighted British successes at a time when the British 
intelligence services were being heavily criticized, showed the importance of intelligence in 
winning the Second World War and paved the way for intelligence scholars to draw on their 
revelations to present a fresh take on the conflict.  
 
The real growth in serious books on intelligence, however,  was due  to ‘the appearance of a 
series of ground-breaking works on British intelligence over the space of little more than half 
a decade from 1979 through 1986’ 10, notably the initial volume of the official history of 
British Intelligence in the Second World War co-written by a team of scholars led by Sir 
Harry Hinsley11, a collection of essays on governments and intelligence communities The 
Missing Dimension edited by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks12 which showed serious 
work on intelligence history could be produced even when few documents had been released 
and the 1985 publication of Christopher Andrew’s Secret Service: The Making of the British 
Intelligence Community.13 
 
This was accompanied in the United States by congressional hearings and newspaper 
investigations into the American intelligence community linking the CIA with a string of 
illegal domestic operations. This greater public interest and demands for more openness 
encouraged the American government to make more intelligence records available. In 
America the CIA adopted a relatively liberal declassification policy and many FBI files have 
                                                            
6 Christopher Andrew, “Historical Research on the British Intelligence Community,”  in R 
Godson (ed), Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third 
World, (London: Brassey’s, 1988). 
7 Christopher Moran, “The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources and Trajectories 
in the United Kingdom,” Studies in Intelligence, 55: 2 (2011), p. 33. 
8 John Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-45 (London: Yale, 1972). 
9 Frederick Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, (London: Harper Collins, 1974). 
10  R Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson and Len Scott (eds), Exploring Intelligence Archives   
(London: Routledge, 2008), p.5. 
11 Harry Hinsley (ed), British Intelligence in the Second World War, (London: HMSO, 1979) 
The book was described by MI6 chief Maurice Oldfield as ‘a book written by a committee, 
about committees for committees’. 
12 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and the 
Intelligence Communities in the 20th century, (London: Palgrave, 1984. 
13 Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community 
(London: Heinemann, 1985). 
increasingly become available or can be requested through FOIA.  Len Scott makes the point 
that ‘the American approach to declassification remains the exemplar of glasnost, and has 
laid the foundation of a corpus of literature that provides for understanding and debate on 
intelligence far exceeding that of any other polity.’14   
 
In April 1995 President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 which ruled that all 
classified documents older than twenty-five years would automatically be declassified unless 
there were important security grounds for retention.  In the event, some 93 million pages of 
documents were exempted and many more await declassification.15  The joint declassification 
of the Venona project, giving details of Western decryption of Soviet cipher communications, 
also led to several new studies.16 By 2007, the CIA had declassified over ten million pages of 
material stored on an electoral search and retrieval system known as CREST.   
 
British governments followed suit but with rather less enthusiasm. However there was a 
greater openness about the intelligence services after the end of the Cold War – partly 
because it was assumed that the role of the intelligence services would become less important 
-  leading to the avowal of the intelligence services in 1992, the ‘Open Government Initiative’ 
of 1992,  a systematic release of MI5 files from 199717 with SOE and GCHQ files following 
– over 200,000 files have now been released - and the authorised centenary histories of MI5 
by Christopher Andrew in 200918 and of MI6 by Keith Jeffery in 2011.19 
Another influence was the 1986 Spycatcher trial in Australia, the British Government’s 
unsuccessful attempt to prevent Peter Wright publishing a memoir of his service in MI5.  It 
‘brought into ridicule British attitudes to disclosure. The fiasco was one element in changing 
attitudes toward unnecessary secrecy.’20 
In the Soviet Union there was a brief moment during glasnost when Soviet archives were 
opened up to Western scholars, most notably with the publishing arrangement with Crown, 
which led to Deadly Illusions and The Crown Jewels21 a book by two former intelligence 
                                                            
14 Len Scott, “Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View”, 
Intelligence and National Security, 22 (2007), p.86. 
15  For an American view of British releases see Bradley F Smith, “New Intelligence releases: 
A British side to the story,” Intelligence and National Security, 14:1 (1999), pp168-175. 
16 John Earl Haynes, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage  in America  (London: Yale, 1999); 
Nigel West,  Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War (London: Collins,1999); Eric 
Breindel and Herbert  Romerstein , The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and 
America’s Traitors (Washington: Regnery, 2000). The release of the Venona decrypts by the 
British was driven not be openness but pressure from the NSA as much of the American 
Venona material was already on the NSA website.  
17 Stephen Lander, “British Intelligence in the Twentieth Century,” Intelligence and National 
Security, 17:1(2002), pp7-20 gives a useful breakdown of MI5’s records and release policy. 
18 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, (London: Allen Lane, 2009). 
19  Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, (London: Bloomsbury, 
2010). Details of the British Government’s approach to declassification can be found in Gill 
Bennett, “Declassification and release policies of the UK’s intelligence agencies,” 
Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 ( 2002) , pp21-32 .  
20 Scott, “Sources”, p.188. 
21  John Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions; Oleg Tsarev and Nigel West The 
Crown Jewels. 
officers on Berlin22, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America23 and Spies: The Rise 
and Fall of the KGB in America.24 In the early 1990s numerous retired KGB officers, some of 
them quite senior, sat down and began to write their memoirs with the result, Richard Aldrich 
notes, that there was ‘a growing danger that the history of British intelligence will be written 
by its enemies’.25 
 
The response in this propaganda war was British releases of material co-authored by Soviet 
defectors. As Richard Aldrich has also noted ‘The SIS decision to permit historical work 
based on cooperation with Oleg Gordievsky and on the Mitrokhin archive was probably the 
most adventurous example of official support for the writing of the history of secret service 
that was seen during the 1990s’.26 The result was two important books for intelligence 
scholars – both co-authored by Christopher Andrew - KGB: Inside Story and The Mitrokhin 
Archive.27 
 
Official and authorised histories of intelligence or histories where covert help has been given   
proved a way forward for governments balancing their need to control disclosure and the 
demands for greater transparency. As Richard Aldrich has written: 
 
Official history has played an intriguing role in the policing of Britain’s secret past. 
For the policy-makers, the official history has offered multiple advantages. Carrying 
the stamp of authority, official history permitted a sober account of events to be 
advanced that contrasted with the increasingly sensationalist nature of ‘outsider’ 
publications. Moreover, it provided some positive influence over that difficult terrain 
– the public understanding of the past – while at the same time appearing more 
reasonable than simply ‘stonewalling’ on the subject of intelligence.28  
 
He concluded ‘From the authorities’ point of view, official history remains by far the best 
way forward in the face of awkward declassification problems.’29 
 
Christopher Andrew has been one of the main beneficiaries of such co-operation 30 but others 
who have been given access to SIS records include Gordon Brook-Shepherd with his study of 
                                                            
22 David Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin:CIA vs KGB in 
the Cold War (London: Yale University Pres,1997). 
23 Alexander Vassiliev and Allen Weinstein, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in 
America, (New York: Random House, 1998). 
24 Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes and Alexander Vassiliev Spies: The Rise and Fall of the 
KGB in America, (New Haven: Yale, 2009). 
25 Richard J. Aldrich, “Never-never land and wonderland? British and American policy on 
intelligence archives,” Contemporary Record, 8:1(1994), p.146. 
26 Richard J Aldrich, “Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy and British Intelligence 
since 1945,” English Historical Review, 119: 483 (2009),  p.952. 
27 Christopher. Andrew and Oleg Gordievesky, KGB: Inside Story, (London: Harper Collins, 
1990); Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive. (London: Allen Lane, 
2001). 
28 Aldrich, “Policing the Past”, p. 922. 
29 Ibid p.953. 
30 His collaborations have included Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The 
Inside Story of its Foreign from Lenin to Gorbachev, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990 ) 
which confirmed John Cairncross as ‘The Fifth Man’. 
western intelligence and the Bolshevik revolution31, Alan Judd’s biography of the first Chief 
of SIS, Sir Mansfield Cumming32, Andrew Cook’s life of the SIS officer Sidney Reilly33, the 
BBC correspondent Gordon Corera’s book on SIS 34 and Times journalist Ben McIntyre with 
his life of Oleg Gordievsky35. All these authors have been given access to former members of 
the intelligence agencies but what they have written has been subject to control.  
 
Such privileged access to favoured historians rather than making the records equally available 
to all historians has attracted some criticism with E.D.R Harrison writing to The Times that 
‘official histories of this kind belongs to the era of deference to government and fits 
awkwardly with a modern intelligence service’.36 Yet a modern intelligence service is all 
about public image and these curated and controlled releases may well be an increasing 
occurrence and the only way intelligence scholars will be able to have access to certain 
subjects. 
 
The UK Freedom of Information Act came into force on 1st January 2005, providing 
everyone with the right to ask for information from public sector bodies, including central 
government departments and this, to an extent, has facilitated access to official files though 
there are plenty of exemptions which can be utilised by governments.37 One of twenty three 
exemptions, section 23, deals with ‘Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing 
with security matters’ – the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 
Government Communications Headquarters, Special Forces and the National Intelligence 
Criminal Service. This is on top of the blanket exemptions in the Public Records Act of 1958 
where section 3(4) allows documents to be retained by government departments for 
‘administrative purposes’ and section 5(1) which provides for the extended closure of 
documents transferred to the National Archives. 
 
The fact few files are released by the intelligence agencies has meant intelligence historians 
have had to revert to a long-standing practice of research in ‘adjacent’ files which may hold 
intelligence material, a practice, most notably utilised by Richard Aldrich whilst writing his 
history of GCHQ where his sources included documents from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
The Black Door which used files from the Public Works Department.38 Stalin’s Englishman 
for that reason drew on extensive requests, many under FOIA, to the Foreign Office (Security 
Department, News Department, PUS files), Joint Broadcasting Committee files at the British 
                                                            
31 Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze: The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks 
(London: Macmillan, 1998). 
32 Alan Judd, The Quest for Mansfield and the Founding of the Secret Service (London: 
Harper Collins, 1999). 
33 Andrew Cook, On His Majesty’s Secret Service: Sidney Reilly (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 
2002). 
34 Gordon Corera, The Art of Betrayal: Life and Death in the British Secret Service (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011). 
35 Ben McIntyre, The Spy and the Traitor, (London: Viking: 2018). 
36 EDR Harrison, Letter to The Times, 15 August 2002. 
37 A good account of how intelligence historians can use FOIA is Christopher Murphy and 
Daniel Lomas, “Return to Neverland? Freedom of Information and the History of British 
Intelligence,” The Historical Journal , 57:1 ( 2014), pp 273-287. 
38  Richard Aldrich, GCHQ (London: Harper Collins: 2010) and Richard Aldrich and Rory 
Cormac,  The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers (London: 
Harper Collins, 2016). 
Council and Ministry of Information, the HS series of SOE files, Ministry of Defence files 
and the files of the Cabinet Office such as the PREM series. 
 
Even the limited programme of releases, in particular of MI5 documents, has had a major 
impact on intelligence studies. This has led to a plethora of books based on archival research 
as well as a growth in the number of journals such as Intelligence and National Security 
founded by Christopher Andrew and Michael Handel in 1984, Studies in Intelligence, the 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and the Journal of Intelligence 
History and from 1986 general historical journals, such as The Journal of Contemporary 
History, The Journal of Cold War Studies and The English Historical Review, beginning to  
publish articles on intelligence. 
 
The number of university courses also grew in departments of International Politics, 
International History, History, Politics and War Studies producing students looking to write 
on intelligence subjects. Marjorie Cline’s Teaching Intelligence in the mid-1980s: A survey of 
college and university courses on the subject of intelligence published in 1985 was one of the 
first guides to courses on intelligence with the most recent being AFIO’s Guide to the Study 
of Intelligence published in 2016.39  
In Britain there are now major centres for the study of intelligence at the universities of 
Brunel, Buckingham and Aberystwyth while respected Masters courses have been taught at 
Edinburgh, Cambridge and Salford for over a quarter of a century.40  In addition ‘Academic 
papers on intelligence and intelligence-related subjects are an integral part of the annual 
conferences of the British International History Group, the British International Studies 
Association, and the British Political Studies Association which since 1993 has hosted its 
own Security and Intelligence Studies Group.’41 
Writing in 2013 Christopher Murphy and Christopher Moran noted ‘In both the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the field of intelligence studies represents one of the fastest 
growing subsets of international history, political science and strategic studies. This 
dynamism is evidenced not only by the vast volume of publications that are generated, but by 
the existence of dedicated departments and centres, specialist degree programmes, 
conferences and professional associations….In short, the study of intelligence is booming’.42 
The challenge  of intelligence history 
 
It is clear that intelligence studies have come of age but challenges and obstacles remain for 
the historian, both in terms of research and integrating that research into wider historical 
studies. 
                                                            
39 Marjorie Cline, “Teaching Intelligence in the mid-1980s: A survey of college and 
university courses on the subject of intelligence,” National Intelligence Study Centre, 1985 
and AFIO’s Guide to the Study of Intelligence, (Washington: AFIO, 2016). 
40 Paul Maddrell, “Intelligence Studies at UK Universities: An Expanding Subject”, Autumn 
2003, CIISS: http://users..aber.ac.uk/rbh/iss/uk.htm. 
41 Scott, “Sources”, p.199. 
42 Christopher Moran and Christopher Murphy (ed), ‘Intelligence Studies Now and Then’ in 
Intelligence Studies in Britain and the US: Historiography since 1945, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press,2013), p.1. 
 
The first is the comparative lack of archival material compared to other historical areas 
though as Donald Cameron Watt has pointed out  ‘historians of twentieth-century 
developments in the West are spoiled in comparison to their colleagues in medieval or early 
modern fields, by the plethora of detailed source material at their disposal’.43 
 
SIS never release their archives and the releases from MI5 and other parts of the Intelligence 
community have been inconsistent and slow. For example, rather than reveal all the files on a 
particular year or case, which would allow a full study to be conducted, MI5 have made 
public selective material often more with an eye to a newspaper headline than proper 
historical revelation, a policy of managed openness, where the splashy occasional release is 
used to persuade the public of a greater transparency that remains, in practice, quite limited. 
For example, though hundreds of Burgess and Maclean case files from the Foreign Office 
Security Department and MI5 were released in October 2015, they were far from complete 
and about 20% of the material was redacted. It is apparent from a close reading that many of 
the interviews with key players, such as Goronwy Rees, Harold Nicolson and Victor 
Rothschild, remain closed nor has there been release of any material relating to other 
members of the Ring such as Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt or John Cairncross.  
 
Even then government files are not necessarily ‘the holy grail’. Even when made public they 
may only represent a partial picture and they may in Christopher Andrew’s phrase be 
‘laundered’44 or as Richard Aldrich has claimed be ‘an analogue of reality’45.  Though useful, 
intelligence historians have to be constantly aware that government records can be a highly 
manipulated source of evidence. Peter Jackson has pointed out ‘Not only do intelligence 
documents not speak for themselves, some may also dissemble and some may even lie.’46  
 
They may lie through omission in terms of release or simply from the fact that the files only 
record what the government themselves knew.  A good case is the collections of documents 
released during glasnost by the Russian Intelligence Services, in return for large advances, 
and edited by a member of the service.47 In each case, the Western co-author, who did not 
speak Russian, was presented with translated extracts from Russian files. The books certainly 
showed what documents the Cambridge Spies had given the Russians - and are often the only 
access scholars have to such documents which are closed in the West – but they are selective, 
provide little context and invariably portray Soviet Intelligence in a favourable light.48 A 
                                                            
43 D Cameron Watt, “Intelligence and the Historian: A comment on John Gaddis’s 
“Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins,” Diplomatic History, 14: 2(1990), p.199. 
44 Christopher Andrew, “Secret Intelligence and British foreign policy 1900-1939”, in 
Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International relations 1900-
1945 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,1987) , p.9. 
45 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, (London: John Murray, 2001), p.6. 
46 R Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson and Len Scott (ed), Introduction to Exploring Intelligence 
Archives, (London: Routledge, 2008), p.3. 
47 Oleg Tsarev and John Costello, Deadly Illusions (New York: Crown, 1993)  Oleg Tsarev 
and Nigel West, The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB’s Archives 
(London: Yale, 2009) Oleg Tsarev and Nigel West, Triplex: Secrets from the Cambridge 
Spies (London: Yale, 2009). 
48 An overview of access to Russian Intelligence archives can be found in Amy Knight, 
“Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counter-Intelligence, 12:3 (1999), pp 325-37. 
further problem for intelligence historians is that what Soviet officials reported is not 
necessarily true – many were keen to stay in the West and often exaggerated threats – and 
many Soviet documents have been shown to be fake either for propaganda purposes or 
because they might have a commercial value to researchers. 
 
The intelligence historian, therefore, has to balance research in public collections, with 
material from private archives but even private archives have their problems. Those kept by 
large institutions are weeded on deposition or even many years later with sensitive material 
removed or redacted. Documents quoted in one book are often not there for the next 
researcher. Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor donated his papers to the RAF Museum at 
Hendon where they were open to scholars in the mid-1980s. When the MOD became aware 
of this they were transferred to the Air Historical Branch at the Ministry of Defence, weeded 
and then in the mid-1990s placed in the National Archives. The former SIS officer Gerald 
Wilkinson’s papers at Churchill College, Cambridge were used by David Stafford for his 
joint biography of Churchill and Roosevelt but subsequently censored at the request of the 
Cabinet Office.49 
 
I know from my own experience as a visiting Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge that 
members of the Intelligence Services and Cabinet Office regularly visit the archive to check 
on new depositions before public release. Lord Mountbatten’s papers, on which I am 
currently working, were weeded by a former member of MI6 before being loaned to 
Southampton University. The archivist at Southampton subsequently advised the Cabinet 
Office that further material should be closed and that was achieved by a Ministerial Directive 
in 2010. 
 
Even archives kept by the family may have been partially destroyed by the subject or a family 
member or only parts of the archive shown to the researcher. This can be for all sorts of 
reasons, quite apart from national security, but they mean that private papers when they exist 
– and many are destroyed such as those of the spy chief Sir Joseph Ball - are not always as 
complete as one would wish. For example, only part of the correspondence between Lord 
Mountbatten and his close friend Sibilla O’Donnell was shown by her to Mountbatten’s 
official biographer Philip Ziegler in the early 1980s because her husband was still alive. With 
her husband’s death, I have been able to view the full correspondence. 
 
So by its very nature intelligence history is difficult to research. Much of it remains secret 
and will never be made publicly available.  In 1924 the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, solemnly told the House of Commons that, ‘It is of the essence of a Secret 
Service that it must be secret, and if you once begin disclosure it is perfectly obvious…that 
there is no longer any Secret Service and that you must do without it.’50 Those who serve in 
intelligence are bound by the Official Secrets Act and cannot talk about their work. Even 
when they do, there is no guarantee they are telling the truth nor that the files deposited in 
archives are accurate – they simply reflect the information gathered by the intelligence 
services. An intelligence historian has to rely on a variety of sources to tell their story, 
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50 House of Commons, Official Record, 15 December 1924, col.674. 
balancing like any historian, the credibility of the information and always seeking, where 
possible, to corroborate it. 
 
Richard Aldrich has argued ‘Government files that are allowed into the public domain are 
placed there by authorities as a result of deliberate decision. The danger is that those who 
work only on this controlled material may become something close to official historians, 
albeit once removed’.51 He quotes the case of The Ultra secret where a select band of 
historians writing the Official History of the Second World War were told about Ultra but 
then could not reveal it providing other and totally wrong explanations for events. 
 
‘Well-packaged programmes of document release have allowed governments to move beyond 
an old-fashioned “stonewalling” approach…into a new era in which the authorities set the 
agenda for archive based researchers.’52 It is a real problem for intelligence historians where 
very few official records are kept - Aldrich estimates 2% - and who as a result ‘contest with 
government over secrecy, but mostly these are tactical skirmishes. Arguments usually take 
place over the closure of individual documents located within the thin slice of material 
selected for preservation. Meanwhile the bulk of contemporary history heads towards the 
incinerators unseen and largely uncontested.’53 He continues ‘Contemporary historians who 
explore the state are quite unique. Nowhere else is the researcher confronted with evidence 
precisely managed by their subject. From astronomy to agriculture, from botany to the built 
environment, no investigator confronts information so deliberately pre-selected.’54  
 
Yet is this really true?  Of course, government files whether they come from the Intelligence 
Services or Department of Agriculture are selected by the departmental records officer and 
exemptions may liberally be applied but there are so many copies of files across Whitehall 
departments that it is difficult to have a consistent vetting procedure to ensure that everything 
sensitive is retained or destroyed. Peter Jackson reviewing Aldrich’s The Hidden Hand makes 
the point: 
 
that very few professionally trained historians believe everything they read in the 
archives. Meanwhile, the assumption that the ‘real’ story behind policy making is 
usually either hidden or excised from the archival record attributes an unrealistic level 
of efficiency to government machinery engaging in the on-going struggle to maintain 
secrecy and shape popular perceptions (even the ‘Ultra Secret’ was eventually 
leaked). Moreover, it is highly unlikely that such a secret could be kept secret in the 
present era of increasingly intrusive mass media. The ‘inner stuff of secret history’ 
has a way of turning up somewhere, as official leaks to the press, in private papers, in 
memoirs, or in published diaries, and increasingly, in oral testimony.55 
 
Certainly I found Sir Patrick Reilly’s correspondence with the Foreign Office Head of 
Security George Carey-Foster in the Bodleian Library – the first researcher to do so even 
though the papers had been deposited in Oxford for many years - which sheds fresh light into 
the investigations of Burgess showing which official knew what and when. That is an 
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encouraging example of ‘adjacent’ files but what if the two men had not deposited their 
correspondence in a public archive or had even destroyed the correspondence. How do we 
know what we don’t know? Just because it hasn’t been discovered, doesn’t mean it hasn’t 
happened.  
 
Jackson continues ‘It is difficult enough for governments to control the material contained in 
their own national archives, but they have little or no control over declassification and 
destruction procedures in other countries’56 but this is not true.  Section 27(1) of the Freedom 
of Information Act provides exemptions ‘if its disclosure would, or would be likely to 
prejudice: relations between the United Kingdom and any other state; relations between the 
United Kingdom and any other international organisation or international court; the interests 
of the United Kingdom abroad; the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of its 
interests abroad.’ 57 It is true some material on Burgess was found in Russian archives but 





nor should we necessarily assume that there is always a ‘hidden history’ that will 
transform our understanding of past events. Our understanding of complex historical 
phenomena is too contingent on the temporal and ideological context in which we 
operate. Indeed, an excessive preoccupation of turning  up new and hitherto secret 
information is a potential weakness of intelligence history…The special importance 
placed on turning up new information for its own sake can sometimes overshadow the 
scholar’s responsibility to provide a systematic analysis of what this new material tells 
us about the dynamics of policy-making and politics more generally…The historian 
must develop a feel for how papers moved within and across departments, as well as a 
sense of the institutional cultures of these organisations in general and prevailing 
attitudes towards intelligence information in particular’.58 
 
It is certainly true information needs to be interpreted and doesn’t exist in isolation but often 
there are few papers to follow across departments. For example, there are hardly any 
references to Burgess in the British Embassy papers in Washington 1950-1951.  It is clear 
they have been weeded as references abound for those in the same role in the Embassy as his 
on either side of those dates. How then can one assess to what information he had access and 
could therefore betray? Fortunately, in this case, we again have the evidence of the 
documentation sent to Moscow and made available in some of the Russian books such as The 
Crown Jewels. Likewise, there is no trace of Burgess at the Information Research Department 
in government files but here secondary literature and interviews with Burgess’s Foreign 
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The importance of oral testimony 
 
So the intelligence historian needs to conduct interviews and not rely just on government files 
and private archives, not least because much of what is of interest may never have been 
recorded on paper or, if so, has not been kept or  will ever be released. Though nobody has 
written about the use of interviews when writing on British intelligence, Andrew Hammond 
has done so with regard to the history of the CIA.60 He argues ‘that while intelligence history 
                                                            
60  Andrew Hammond, “Through a Glass Darkly: The CIA and Oral History,” History, 
100:340 (2015), pp 311-326. 
and oral history each harbour their own meta-theoretical perils and biases, pitfalls which may 
in fact be exacerbated when they are conjoined, the relationship between them may in fact be 
a productive, generative one.61  He is aware of objections by some academic historians that  
‘it is inferior to the written word; interviewing is the business of social scientists rather than 
historians; human memory is often faulty and unreliable, prone to the crustaceans of time; 
oral history interviews are unrepresentative, the results un-generalizable; the questioning may 
be biased; and so forth’.62  
 
He accepts intelligence history provides a further problem that ‘knowledge is 
compartmentalized, there are silos of secrecy; information is often shared on a need-to-know 
basis; many people do not want to share what they know’63.  And he continues: 
 
how do you know you are not being misled or lied to?...These people are professional 
liars, how can you trust what they say?...they are experts in psychological seduction, 
trained to mislead, to deceive, to provide cover stories, to hide things; they are skilled 
in subversion and covert operations; they are just as likely to subvert the historical 
record as anything else.64  
 
Furthermore ‘Are they merely score-settling, axe-grinding, legacy-building or attempting to 
rewrite history? To what extent have we pulled our punches through not wanting to upset our 
interviewees, to remain in their good graces or to keep that door open for future research?’65  
 
These are all elements any historian must bear in mind but it does not mean oral history does 
not have a place in intelligence history which is being increasingly recognised also by 
government records departments. The CIA, SIS and the Foreign Office have oral history 
programmes but they rely on former members of the service being willing to speak, being 
open and being properly questioned by knowledgeable interviewers. Only the latter is open – 
it is at Churchill College, Cambridge and it is heavily censored – but reminiscences can be 
useful for the revealing anecdote, character description, or personal insight especially to an 
undocumented episode and how key players saw events unfolding. 
 
Of course interviews have to be treated with caution. The interviewee may want to please but 
have forgotten or simply conflated what they’ve read elsewhere and thought happened. They 
may not be telling the truth deliberately or never knew in the first place. An interviewee may 
be prosecuted or lose their pension if they speak too freely and may therefore be evasive. 
They may wish to protect their reputation and not tell the truth or want to undermine someone 
else’s reputation. Given the ‘need-to-know’ principle, have they the full picture? Malcolm 
Muggeridge, who himself served in British Intelligence, later wrote ‘Diplomats and 
intelligence agents, in my experience, are even bigger liars than journalists, and the historians 
who try to construct the past out of their records are, for the most part, dealing in fantasy.’66  
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I encountered examples of all in the course of my research, not least Muggeridge himself who 
gives a vivid description of Burgess and Bentinck Street during World War Two in his memoirs, 
written in the 1970s, but judging from his own diary entry for 7 February 1948, he only met 
Burgess after the war. ‘Present: character called Burgess (Foreign Office). Burgess lamentable 
character, very left-wing, obviously seeking to climb on the Socialist bandwagon.  Long, tedious, 
rather acrimonious argument.’ 67  One of my interviewees, who claimed to know Burgess, I 
subsequently discovered only came to Britain after Burgess had fled to Moscow. It was clear 
one of Burgess’s contemporaries at Dartmouth had confused Burgess with someone else so 
his interview wasn’t used.  Another claimed he had reported Burgess for stealing at 
Dartmouth and that was the reason – not his poor eyesight - he left but put the date as ‘late in 
1925’. Given Burgess left Dartmouth  in July 1927 I relegated that account to a footnote 
especially as Burgess’s wartime medical records showed he had poor eyesight. Similarly an 
account of a Burgess visit to Churchill at Chartwell given by a Burgess colleague at the BBC, 
John Green, to the writer Andrew Boyle was left to a footnote because I could not 
corroborate it. 
 
Colleagues of Burgess, such as Bernard Burrows, refused to corroborate whilst others simply 
did not respond to my approaches.  A former MI6 officer Nigel Clive agreed to meet at an 
expensive restaurant and managed to extract far more from me than I ever managed from 
him. Three former Burgess lovers Clarissa Churchill, Charles Fletcher-Cooke and Sir Steven 
Runciman denied the love affairs yet the affairs can be corroborated from interviews with 
others, MI5 reports and Burgess’s own letters. Edward Playfair, one of Burgess’s closest 
friends as a young man and later interviewed by MI5, wrote  to me ‘I never sought his 
company because I rather disliked him…’68  whilst Gladwyn Jebb, one of Burgess’s greatest 
mentors, claimed in his memoirs he had secured Burgess’s sacking in 1940.  Fred Warner, a 
Foreign Office colleague of Burgess and probable lover, told Andrew Boyle that he had 
found an injured Burgess at a gay nightclub, only by chance, but Burgess’s boyfriend Jack 
Hewitt and Robin Maugham both give accounts of Warner being with Burgess at the 
nightclub all evening.69  
 
The self-confessed spy Michael Straight gave different versions of his encounters with 
Burgess in his testimony to the FBI in the 1960s, in his memoir70, in interviews with other 
spy writers and myself. Which to believe if any? Brian Sewell has given several different 
versions of his encounter with Burgess.71 Sergei Kondrashev, one of Burgess’s handlers in 
Moscow, had never spoken before about Burgess and had important insights but he claimed 
the Soviets did not mind exposing Philby with the flight of Burgess because they had others. 
Disinformation or covering up a mistake? Donald Maclean’s brother, Alan, claimed when 
interviewed that he hardly knew Burgess though I discovered only after his death that they 
had been close friends and shared a flat. 
 
Timing is indeed key. Goronwy Rees’s sister-in-law, Mary Hardy, remembered little when I 
spoke to her in the 1980s but had much better recall when I saw her in 2015. Had she held 
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something back and now in her nineties couldn’t care less what was said or had I simply got 
her on a better day? Sometimes an interviewee has a different relationship than the one 
expected. I contact Martin Young as a former member of the Apostles. He had not met 
Burgess there but gave me a story about meeting him in Cuba when Burgess was acting as a 
King’s Messenger. 
 
According to an unpublished and un-translated section of The Mitrokhin archive, now in 
Churchill College, Cambridge,  Burgess had tried to recruit one of his wartime MI5 
colleagues and,  though he was rebuffed the approach, was not reported. I had my suspicions 
of who the man might be but as the man’s daughter had been very helpful, let me reproduce a 
photograph and I did not have concrete proof, I did not name the man. The music critic Philip 
Hope Wallace claimed he had been on holiday in Italy with Burgess just before he fled in 
1951.72 Since Burgess had not been on holiday in Italy or anywhere else for at least a year 
and there is no evidence he knew Hope Wallace well, I only included the story in a footnote. 
A dozen people in memoirs or interviews said they dined with Burgess the night before he 
fled in 1951. If so, he must have been very full. For his movements in his final week I 
preferred to trust the reports of the MI5 surveillance team above anyone else. 
 
For all the caveats, oral testimony can be crucial especially when governments attempt to 
manipulate history. The Whitehall version that the flight was only discovered on Monday 28th 
May 1951 continues to be accepted even though Stalin’s Englishman gives several accounts 
of the flight being noticed and reported on over the weekend including testimony from MI5 
officer Russell Lee on the Friday and Jane Portal on the Saturday.73 Without these interviews 
the only evidence would be that in the archives which supports the official version.  
 
A document produced for the 30th anniversary of the disappearance of the two diplomats in 
1982, and which I recently discovered, lists 200 files which need to be reviewed.74  Many still 
remained closed including: Milo Talbot’s interview revealing he had suspected Burgess of 
being a Communist; the interview between Burgess’s step-father Jack Bassett and George 
Carey-Foster; a letter from Gladwyn Jebb to the PUS; details of the talks between the head of 
the FBI J. Edgar Hoover and head of MI5 Sir Percy Sillitoe; Gladwyn Jebb’s interview with 
George Carey-Foster and Security Office Robert Mackenzie on Burgess. Without the 
‘adjacent’ document found in the Foreign Office library department and dated some thirty 







Sources for Stalin’s Englishman 
 
The research for Stalin’s Englishman began in 1984 and concluded in 2015. It consisted of 
interviews with almost a hundred people, most of whom had never spoken before, who knew 
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Burgess at Eton, Dartmouth, Cambridge, in the BBC and Foreign Office and socially as well 
as interviews with members of his family and his Russian handlers.75 
 
This was supplemented by secondary reading of books and scholarly articles which referred 
to him, newspaper accounts, school and university records, his BBC and Foreign Office 
personnel files, private diaries and correspondence, the research papers of spy writers such as 
Andrew Boyle76, declassified M15, Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and Home Office files at 
the National Archives and from the FBI and Russian archives and oral history collections at 
the Imperial War Museum77 and Guardian.78 
 
As far as possible, primary sources were used over secondary so, for example, I traced the 
original manuscript of Goronwy Rees’s A Chapter of Accidents in the National Library of 
Wales.79 This had not been looked at since it was deposited in the 1960s. It differed from the 
published edition revealing, for example, that Burgess and Maclean had had an affair at 
Cambridge80 and that Blunt was aware of Burgess’s espionage activities.81 The papers also 
showed that Rees may well have been a Russian spy.82 
 
Several unpublished memoirs and biographies added to the picture, most notably the memoirs 
of Jack Hewitt83, Kenneth Sinclair-Loutit84, Dilkusha  Rohan85, the journalists Stephen 
Harper and John Mossman86 and Anthony Blunt87 and  David Leitch’s  biography of Guy 
Burgess88. Steven Runciman’s diaries, still held by the family, provided evidence of the close 
relationship – one denied by Runciman - between the two men whilst MI5 officer Guy 
Liddell’s diary, now in the National Archives, proved invaluable for an insider’s account of 
MI5 between 1939 and 1953.89 
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I also had the benefit of Burgess’s letters to the great love of his life Peter Pollock, lent by the 
latter before his death, which are revealing about Burgess’s inner life, his dreams for the 
future and the difficulties in his love life and Goronwy Rees’s highly autobiographical 
screenplay Influence, an account of Burgess which was never made but was full of 
fascinating nuggets about Burgess’s private life.90 
 
Burgess’s school record at Lockers Park showed him to have been a brilliant and 
conventional student from an early age whilst research at Eton showed his developing interest 
in politics.91 Study of the Trinity College archives and Cambridge University archives 
confirmed his academic success at Cambridge where he was awarded several scholarships. 
An examination of the minute books of the Apostles showed the Apostles were not politicised 
until much later than hitherto thought 92 whilst the Cambridge University Socialist Society 
minute books for the period, recently released by MI5, revealed the most active overt 
Communists in the university at the time.93 
 
The National Archives proved a fruitful source, most notably the files of the Foreign Office 
Security Department  - FO series 158 - whilst the Far East Department  memos and briefing 
papers showed how trusted and respected Burgess was by his more senior colleagues, the 
depth of his knowledge, his excellent drafting skills and how he was able to both interpret 
and shape policy even given his comparatively junior status.94 
 
The FBI kept copious files on Burgess and proved a useful source on the American side of 
the story and Anglo-American liaison. Triangulating various copies of the same document 
showed how redactions had not always been consistent. 
 
Other collections which provided useful material included: the British Library (Roy Harrod 
papers); Bodleian Library (Patrick Reilly papers especially MS England c6920 and Joseph 
Ball papers MS England c6656); Christ Church, Oxford  (Tom Driberg papers);  Churchill 
College, Cambridge (Mitrokhin archive); King’s College, Cambridge (Noel Annan, Dadie 
Ryland, Rosamond Lehmann’s papers); London School of Economics (Herbert Morrison 
papers); Public Record Office, Northern Ireland (Derek Hill papers);  Indiana University 
(Robin Maugham papers); Princeton (Harold Nicolson papers including unpublished parts of 
his diary);  Georgetown University (Anthony Cave Brown papers); and  National Library of 
Australia (Richard Hall papers). 
 
The BBC maintain extensive files on staff and contributors to programmes allowing one to 
chart Burgess’s career at the Corporation between 1936 and 1944, his skills as a talks 
producer and how he leveraged  his job to network and act as an agent of influence. 
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News reports are not always accurate, and some wartime national papers seem to have been 
censored, but regional accounts revealed Burgess’s appearances in court for drunken driving 
in London in 1940 and Dublin in 1949.95  
 
Secondary sources often had revealing anecdotes about him.  Nigel Tangye remembered him 
at Dartmouth96,  Alan Hodgkin had an anecdote about a Cambridge march97 whilst a member 
of his BBC cohort in 1936 leaves a pictures of him in a book published in 1941.98 
 
In October 2015, just after the first publication of Stalin’s Englishman, some four hundred 
Foreign Office and MI5 files on Burgess and Maclean were released. They provided extra 
detail but nothing substantial and many were incorporated into the June 2016 paperback and 
October 2016 American editions. They included surveillance reports showing the movements 
of Burgess and Maclean in the week before they fled and chapter and verse on Burgess’s 
engagements to Clarissa Churchill - niece of Winston Churchill and wife of Anthony Eden - 
and Esther Whitfield, the secretary and mistress of Kim Philby.99  
They confirmed Burgess’s ‘roaring affair’ at Cambridge with Maclean100, that he had 
unsuccessfully tried to stay in MI5 after World War Two,101 how he came close to being 
sacked several times from the Foreign Office for poor work and that at his death he was 
writing a memoir which named Blunt ‘as having been the man who warned him that the 
security net was closing around him’ – a memoir which vanished on his death.102 There is 
also a copy of a memoir by Philby written some fifteen years before his autobiography My 
Silent War published in 1968.103 
The files also contain an MI5 interview with Goronwy Rees, interviewed ten days after the 
disappearance, in which he named Robin Zaehner, Edward Playfair, Andre Revai and John 
Cairncross as Soviet agents.104  Victor Rothschild in a similar interview named Adam Watson 
and Judith Hart as possible spies.105 The jury remains out on Zaehner and Playfair whilst 
Watson was cleared, Revai is suspected of being agent ‘Toffee’ and Hart confessed. 
The new releases raised more questions than they answered. The official story is Burgess 
only joined British Intelligence when he was seconded to the Joint Broadcasting Committee, 
a secret propaganda organisation, in January 1939 yet there are references in the new files, 
that  ‘from about 1936 onwards (ie before the time of the GRAND organisation) Footman 
and Burgess were collaborating in the running of an Agent network for MI6’. 106 Certainly an 
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analysis of the stamps in his passport suggests his travels to the Continent in the late thirties 
were more extensive than realised nor can be accounted for by holidays. 
Though extensive investigations were carried out, some obvious contacts were not 
interviewed. According to Tim Marten, a colleague of Burgess in the Washington Embassy, 
neither he, Jellicoe and Greenhill were ever interviewed. ‘It struck both Jellicoe and myself as 
very odd that, so far as we knew, no attempt was made to obtain information about Burgess 
from his colleagues in Chancery and in the Embassy who might be expected to know 
something about him’.107 
The new documents confirm the British were reluctant to admit the breach of security to the 
Americans. ‘In Patrick Reilly’s absence on leave I would strongly urge that we should, at any 
rate for the time being, not tell the Ministry of Defence or the JIC, anything about the main 
security enquiry underlying the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess’.108 
 
They also provide evidence that the British could have arrested Burgess if he had returned to 
Britain. George Carey-Foster noted ‘that as regards Burgess, there is no legal evidence at 
present available which would justify a prosecution against him for espionage. There is, 
however, legal evidence that Burgess retained in his possession, when he had no right to 
retain them, various documents which had been issued to him or to which he had access 
during the course of his employment, and that therefore should he return, evidence exists 
upon which, in the opinion of MI5, a successful prosecution could be launched against him 
under Section 2(b) of the Official; Secrets Act, 1911, as amended by the Official Secrets Act, 
1920’.109 
 
The new files reveal that suspicions were immediately raised about Kim Philby, Anthony 
Blunt and John Cairncross but Cairncross was absolved because  embarrassingly his brother 
Alec, who himself had had Communist sympathies, was the Chief Economic Advisor to 
Treasury . It was argued Cairncross in 1951 was no longer a security threat because he had 
left government service and Russia was a wartime ally conveniently forgetting this was not 
true when he was recruited in 1936.110 
 
The new releases only deal with Burgess and Maclean. The files on Blunt, Philby, Cairncross 
and the lesser-known spies, such as Leo Long and Michael Straight, have still to be made 
public. It’s clear the full story of The Cambridge Spies has not yet emerged.  
 
 
The contribution of Stalin’s Englishman to intelligence history 
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The Academy has traditionally been suspicious of both biography and intelligence studies – 
perhaps because they are so popular – even though there are innumerable distinguished 
practitioners of both from Professors Richard Holmes and Hermione Lee in biography to 
Professors Christopher Andrew and Richard Aldrich in Intelligence.  
 
Richard Holmes has written: 
 
For some three hundred years, from John Aubrey via Lytton Strachey to Peter 
Ackroyd, its most exciting and innovative work has been done outside the established 
institutes of learning, and beyond the groves of academe….Academia, in its turn, has 
not been very keen to recognize biography, especially of a literary kind. It has 
regularly assaulted the form as trivial, revisionist, exploitative, fictive, a corrupter of 
pure texts and probably also of scholarly morals. Most fatal objection of all, 
biography has no serious poetics, no set of post-Aristotelian regulations, and is 
therefore irredeemably subjective.111 
 
In their chapter on ‘Intelligence Studies Now and Then’, Christopher Moran and Christopher 
Murphy  note that ‘While intelligence history has proved incredibly popular with the public at 
large, it has been relatively marginalised within the academic profession, often criticised for 
being prone to sensationalism and uncritical scholarship.’112 
 
One reason is that there is less documentation for intelligence than other academic areas 
which has meant some historians have been reluctant to become involved. As Richard 
Immerman has written ‘To an extent greater than journalists, historians are constitutionally 
wary of undertaking projects in which the unknown unknowns may well prove more vital to 
the story than the knowns and even the known unknowns.’113 
 
One of the criticisms of the first wave of academic intelligence books was that they were dry. 
Reviewing Harry Hinsley’s official history of British Intelligence Ralph Erskine noted 
“Hinsley makes too few judgements, and his book is definitely not bedside reading. Order of 
battle appreciations loom all too large’.114 Subsequently serious intelligence writers, such as 
Christopher Andrew and Richard Aldrich, have realised the importance of bringing the 
subject alive and I hope Stalin’s Englishman continues this new tradition. 
 
Biography in intelligence history can be very useful for various reasons. Not only does it 
humanise the subject but it allows, in the case of a traitor, a psychological examination to try 
and understand why the person became a spy. This is not only intrinsically interesting but has 
wider implications for espionage and counter-espionage services in identifying people who 
might be vulnerable to recruitment. Given the evidential problems with intelligence history, 
the techniques and insights of a biographer – sometimes akin to a novelist – can be valuable. 
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Ben Pimlott has argued that the aim of biography ‘should be to understand an individual life, 
the forces that shape it and the motives that drive it, in the context in which it is placed.’115  
He continues ‘If the quest is for understanding, then public and private facts clearly cannot be 
put in separate boxes’.116 
       
In the case of Burgess, a biography allows one to trace the factors that made him a spy and a 
traitor from his childhood to recruitment in his early twenties, his growing political 
engagement with Marxism and personal disillusionment with the ‘British Establishment’ 
because in his case it is a mixture of both the political and personal. His treachery cannot be 
understood without examining his life. 
 
An analysis of his childhood shows him to have been a spoilt child with no father figure and 
no boundaries set for his behaviour. At Dartmouth, he learnt to hide his feelings and develop 
his multiple personalities – outwardly a successful, conventional student but with mixed 
emotions towards authority and his background and a growing sense of being an outsider. A 
close study of revealing episodes and influences in his youth help to build the picture of the 
budding traitor. 
 
At Eton he appeared outwardly conformist – he was a corporal in the school’s Officer 
Training Corps, a house prefect and represented the school at football but as one 
contemporary noted ‘a bit of a loner and a bit of a rebel. He was looked on as a bit left-wing 
and an outsider in his social and political views’.117 An important influence was his history 
teacher, Robert Birley, sometimes known as ‘Red Robert’ who writing to Burgess’s 
housemaster Frank Dobbs noted ‘The great thing is that he really thinks for himself’.118 
 
Burgess had always read widely, but at Eton his reading became increasingly politicised, with 
Arthur Morrison’s The Hole in the Wall and Tales of Mean Streets and Alexander Paterson’s 
Across the Bridge, with its exposure of conditions in London’s East End, being particularly 
influential. Burgess’s own political views were also being shaped by his history teacher 
Robert Birley’s concern for social justice. A visit by a trade union organiser to the school, 
where he talked about inequalities between rich and poor, only helped to reinforce a growing 
interest in radical politics.119 
 
He was also active in the school debating society discussing whether the English public 
school system was a good idea or not, and ‘Russia – Country of the Future?’ For example, on 
25 October 1929, with police riot squads forced to deal with crowds on Wall Street, he was in 
a minority supporting ‘radical changes are needed at Eton in view of the rise of Socialism’.  
 
 
Burgess continued to win all the prizes at Eton but one distinction eluded him – membership 
of Pop, a self-elected elite of between twenty-four and twenty-eight boys, which conferred 
special privileges such as wearing coloured waistcoats, carrying umbrellas, and caning other 
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non-Pop boys. Between September 1929 and May 1930, Burgess’s name was put forward 
unsuccessfully several times. It didn’t surprise another Eton contemporary, Peter 
Calvocoressi: ‘I don’t think it was very strange that he never got into Pop. There were three 
kinds of Pop members: ex officio, good at games, an exceptionally “good chap”. He was 
none of those things!’120 But to Burgess it was another example of his will being thwarted. 
 
In his second year at Cambridge, 1931-1932, Burgess found the university increasingly 
politicised by the world situation. Unemployment had reached nearly three million, there had 
been a naval mutiny at Invergordon, Britain had been forced off the gold standard, and 
Ramsay MacDonald had been required to form an all-party coalition National Government. 
At the same time there was increasing political instability on the Continent, particularly in 
Germany. Cambridge was not isolated from these developments and its response was 
reflected in both overt and covert activities.  
 
During the summer of 1931, the Cambridge University Socialist Society had been formed by 
Harry Dawes, an ex-miner, and it became the focal point for left-wing radicalism in the 
university and was increasingly infiltrated and used by the communists. Burgess became 
active in CUSS alongside two other students - Kim Philby and Donald Maclean – and 
returning to Cambridge as a research student in autumn 1933 he became part of the Trinity 
College communist cell.  
 
He joined campaigns to support striking city bus drivers and sewage workers, and against 
high rents for council house tenants and helped organise a strike on behalf of Trinity waiters 
against the casual labour system which laid-off most of them during vacations. And he played 
a prominent role in the Armistice Day demonstration of November 1933 and in February 
1934 supported a contingent of hunger marchers passing through Cambridge en route to 
London. 
 
Until this point Burgess’s life had been predicated on his academic success and political 
activism but in March 1934 he was shattered to discover that his doctoral research had 
already been covered in Basil Willey’s The Seventeenth Century Background. Though he 
explored other topics, he had lost interest in academia. It was at this point that the Russians 
made their first approaches to recruit him.  Now it was politics which was to give him a sense 
of self-worth and purpose. In December 1934 Burgess was asked if he would serve the Party. 
He readily agreed. 
 
Traditionally the factors in agent recruitment are MICE – Money, Ideology, Compromise and 
Ego. It is worth looking which of them played a role in Burgess’s recruitment 
 
Money played little part. Though he occasionally accepted money from the Russians, it was 
not his motivation – he had independent means as well as being constantly in well-paid 
employment - and he often refused sums. 
 
 
Ideology was certainly a factor. As an historian at Cambridge, Burgess became enamoured by 
the Marxist interpretation of history.  He would later claim his interest in communism had ‘an 
intellectual and theoretical rather than an emotional basis’.121 Already at Dartmouth, he had 
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been drawn to the determinist view of history propounded by Alfred Mahan’s The Influence 
of Sea Power upon History, a book incidentally which strengthened his anti-American views 
and which were to be another factor in his political sympathies. 
 
One of his subjects for the Cambridge History Tripos was ‘the theory of the Modern State – 
what the state is – the point at which the general study of history touches real life most 
closely’.122 Dissatisfied with what he was being taught he ‘tried to work out a theory of his 
own…the State, he decided, had always been the instrument by which the economically 
dominant group in society exercised power’. 123 He had discovered the arguments of Lenin’s 
The State and Revolution independently. His belief that Communism held the answers was 
shaped by current events, not least a belief that the only bulwark against the rise of the 
Dictators was Communism. 
 
His conversion was also influenced by his personal friendship with an ex-miner from 
Nottingham, Jimmy Lees, and a leading student Communist, David Haden-Guest. He joined 
the Cambridge University Socialist Society which had been infiltrated by the Communists. It 
was from CUSS that his friend Kim Philby would recruit Russia’s long-term penetration 
agents. 
 
Compromise was also a factor in the recruitment. Burgess made no secret of his 
homosexuality – then a criminal offence – but it was paradoxically his sexuality which made 
him attractive to the Russian recruiters.  The Soviet intelligence service had discovered that 
the penalties for homosexuality in Britain meant that homosexuals had to live part of their 
lives in secret and formed a tight and loyal network, which if penetrated, could be very 
fruitful. It was felt that Burgess’s knowledge of, and contacts within, the homosexual world 
could prove very useful and this assessment was proved to be correct. 
 
In a psychological profile, written in 1939, his recruiter Arnold Deutsch concluded 
 
Many features of his character can be explained by the fact that he is a homosexual. He 
became one at Eton, where he grew up in an atmosphere of cynicism, opulence, 
hypocrisy and superficiality. As he is very clever and well-educated, the Party was for 
him a saviour. It gave him above all an opportunity to satisfy his intellectual needs. 
Therefore he took up Party work with great enthusiasm. Part of his private life is led in a 
circle of homosexual friends whom he recruited among a wide variety of people, ranging 
from the famous liberal economist Keynes and extending to the very trash of society 
down to male prostitutes. His personal degradation, drunkenness, irregular way of life, 
and the feeling of being outside society, was connected with this kind of life, but on the 
other hand his abhorrence of bourgeois morality came from this. This kind of life did not 
satisfy him.124 
 
Finally Ego was also a factor. Burgess felt himself to be intellectually superior to his 
contemporaries. This found expression in his membership of a secret society, The Apostles, a 
university discussion group founded in 1820, which drew in some of the cleverest of 
Cambridge students. The Apostles, like many such societies, had its own rituals and 
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language, which helped sustain a sense of being special. Potential recruits – called ‘embryos’ 
– were spotted first by an Apostle and then if considered ‘Apostolic’ were sponsored by a 
member called his ‘father’. The first meeting for a new member was his ‘birth’, where he 
would take an oath, and after being elected he would address his fellow Apostles as ‘brother’. 
 
The Apostles created a strong sense of being special and separate, with a different set of 
allegiances to those who were not members. Apostolic virtues included the importance of 
sexual and emotional honesty, truth, beauty and friendship, which were placed above 
conventional sexual morality and orthodoxy. Many of the Apostles were also part of the 
Bloomsbury Group, a collection of writers, philosophers, economists and artists, who were 
generally left-wing, atheists, pacifists, lovers of the arts and each other. The group was 
influenced by the philosopher and Apostle G.E. Moore, who believed that ‘affectionate 
personal relations and the contemplation of beauty were the only supremely good states of 
mind’. It is perhaps not surprising that the Apostles should prove to be so open to communist 
infiltration. 
 
Burgess was a product of his generation. Born a few years earlier or later, his life would have 
taken a very different course, but he came from a generation politicised during the early 
1930s that felt it needed to stop theorising and do something, even if this call to action took 
many forms and led few to beat a path to Moscow. His fellow Communists at Cambridge, 
David Haden Guest,  went to work with the young Communist League in Battersea, and John 
Cornford to serve the party among the Birmingham working-class, before both died in the 
Spanish Civil War. Maurice Cornforth gave up philosophy to become an agricultural 
organiser in East Anglia, whilst many, such as Eric Hobsbawm, became communist 
intellectuals. 
 
For Burgess, serving the Communist Party in Battersea or Birmingham was less attractive 
than trying to shape political events at the highest level. It played back to his school-day 
fascination with Alfred Maher’s theories of great power blocs and Marxist teachings. Burgess 
needed a moral purpose, to do something positive in the struggle against fascism, and, at a 
vulnerable point in his life, the Russians provided the opportunity. 
 
Writing to Harold Nicolson in 1962, he quoted Stendhal’s ‘The Pistol Shot in the Theatre’ on 
the importance of timing in shaping political and personal decisions: 
You were born too early to be hit by this at the age at which one acts, & the 
intelligentsia of the 40s and 50s were both too late. I was of the generation of the pistol 
shot in the 30s. I notice the intellectuals of the 60s, the young at Aldermaston, have 
again been hit by the continuing fusillade. I notice this with pleasure, one greets others 
getting into the same boat; and with sorrow that they don’t know how rough the crossing 
is.125 
He refused to believe that his God had failed him, as it had Koestler, Spender and the other 
fellow travellers. Like Catholics in the reign of Elizabeth working for the victory of Spain, 
or indeed the sleepers of ISIS now, there was a certainty in the correctness of the choice. It 
was, as Graham Greene would write of Philby, ‘the logical fanaticism of a man who, 
having once found a faith, is not going to lose it because of the injustices or cruelties 
inflicted by erring human instruments’.126 
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Burgess was guided by a strong sense of history, which he then misread. Goronwy Rees 
would write, ‘The truth is that Guy, in his sober moments, had a power of historical 
generalisation which is one of the rarest intellectual faculties, and which gave conversation 
with him on political subjects a unique charm and fascination. It was a power which was, I 
think, completely native and instinctive to him. It might have made him a great historian; 
instead it made him a communist’.127 
 
Just as the nineteenth century had belonged to the British Empire, Burgess felt the twentieth 
century would belong to Russia. George Weidenfeld, at one of Baroness Budberg’s drinks 
parties, remembered how Burgess accused him of ‘sitting on the fence’ by supporting a pro-
European policy for Britain. ‘There is no such thing as a European policy,’ he pontificated. 
‘You’ve either got to choose America or Russia. People may have their own view which to 
choose, but Europe is something wishy-washy that simply does not exist.’128 
 
In Graham Greene’s The Confidential Agent a character says, ‘You choose your side once 
and for all – of course, it may be the wrong side. Only history can tell that’.129 The same can 
be said of Burgess. 
 
No account of Burgess’s life can be written without an understanding of the intellectual 
maelstrom of the 1930s, especially amongst the young and impressionable. In An Englishman 
Abroad, Burgess is asked why he became a spy. ‘At the time it seemed the right thing to do,’ 
he replied. For Burgess and others, their conversion had strong political roots, but most 
fellow members of the Cambridge cells did not spy for the Russians and indeed lost their 
communist fervour in 1939 with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, in 1956 with the invasion of Hungary, 
or simply because they had to get on with the business of earning a living. 
 
So why did Burgess stay the course? Partly because, having picked his football team, he 
loyally stuck with them through thick and thin, capable of all sorts of intellectual somersaults 
to keep in step with the changing situation. He stayed because he was flattered to feel he did 
have a real chance to affect events and from a perverted form of imperialism, that having 
witnessed the death of one empire, he decided to attach himself to another which he felt less 
materialistic. He also stayed because the Russians wouldn’t let him stop and because he 




Burgess was a spoilt child, indulged by his mother and with an absent father – a 
characteristic of several of the Cambridge Ring – and he had never been given 
boundaries. His mother, who refused to set them, seemed to be grateful to first Dartmouth 
and eventually the Soviet Union for so doing. Without a strong moral compass, he was 
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vulnerable to the blandishments of the highly sophisticated Soviet recruitment techniques, 
which offered excitement and a sense of worth. The Soviets recognised his desire for 
clandestine danger in his private life, but also his guilt and desire for some sort of 
redemption, and simply utilised it for their own ends. 
 
The Apostles proved to be fertile recruitment ground, because the society drew men 
attracted by secrecy, by apparent higher loyalties, and a feeling of superiority. Burgess was 
perhaps a classic example of his acquaintance Cyril Connolly’s theory of arrested 
development, a Peter Pan figure who never grew up. Cyril Connolly noted that ‘the child 
whose craving for love is unsatisfied, whose desire for power is thwarted or whose innate 
sense of justice is warped . . . eventually may try to become a revolutionary or a dictator’.130 
Service to the Soviet Union gave Burgess a cause after he had failed with many of his other 
ambitions. A sense of purpose, a new beginning after rejection, the opportunity to create a 
heroic role for himself. 
 
Guy Burgess wanted to be someone and shape events. Knowing he would not make it as a 
Cambridge don or high-flying mandarin, the role offered by the Russians seemed attractive. 
Malcom Muggeridge, a shrewd judge of character, reviewing the Tom Driberg biography 
noted ‘the vanity, snobbishness, romanticism, weakness masquerading as defiance, retreat 
from reality somehow made to seem an advance upon it, which constitute him. One senses 
the influences which played upon him, the perky, half-baked longing somehow to be 
someone’.131 
 
Part of the fascination with Burgess is his complexity and paradoxes. No figure could have 
been more British and Establishment with his Eton and Cambridge education, membership of 
London clubs, expensive clothes, love of British literature, hunting scenes on the walls of his 
flat, and final wish to be buried in Britain. But this was only one part of him and any analysis 
of his character and motivation needs to be aware of his second world – with the romance of 
Russian music and literature and his respect for the ruthlessness of its history and political 
system. 
 
Spies live double lives, sometimes out of necessity, but generally from choice. Burgess 
wasn’t torn between his various lives; they existed in parallel and even together. Marching 
with the hunger marchers he wore his Pitt Club scarf and Old Etonian tie, just in case such 
protective clothing was required. The order of Britain and the wild danger of Russia were 
simply the yin and yang of his personality. 
 
Burgess was not unaware of the purges in the 1930s, the failure of Collectivisation, the labour 
camps, and so on. After all, he lectured on the evils of communism at the Foreign Office 
summer schools and made his reputation as a British propagandist against the Soviet Union, 
notably in the Information Research Department. But though an intelligent man, he was also 
politically naïve – a not uncommon combination – and he simply chose to ignore what did 
not suit him. Any change, such as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, could instantly be explained away in 
view of the bigger picture. 
 
He had learnt to compartmentalise his life and feelings as a child and he carried this 
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through into adulthood. Like an actor, he played each part as required, but he was a Janus. 
To his close friends, and in particular women, he was kind, loyal, stimulating company, a 
good conversationalist, thoughtful and charming. Miriam Rothschild remembered, ‘He had 
slightly protruding top teeth (like a baby thumb-sucker) which made him youthful-looking 
and appealing. And he was always in sort of high spirits – like a school girl’.132 Whilst 
Rosamond Lehmann felt he ‘was not only brilliant, but very affectionate and warm-hearted 
. . . I was very fond of him’.133 
 
Yet from Stanley Christopherson at Lockers Park – ‘He wasn’t the kind of boy I wanted as a 
friend. He wasn’t quite right’ – to over thirty years later, there were those who were repelled 
by him. Margaret Anstee, a young female colleague in the Foreign Office, thought him 
‘extremely repulsive. He was rather greasy and dirty. He was always telling awful dirty 
jokes’.134 
 
Brian Sewell, who was eighteen when he met Burgess, remembered ‘he had egg on his tie, 
tobacco on his breath, and wandering hands; I might have been glad of such hands of a boy of 
my own age, but not his and the accompanying odours – not even the strawberry milk shakes 
that he was inclined to buy me could compensate for those’.135 John Waterlow put it simply, 
‘I don’t think Burgess had any real warmth of character’.136 
 
Harold Nicolson could see both sides of Burgess’s character and his conflicted personality. 
‘He publicly announced his sympathies with communism and yet he heartily disliked the 
Russians . . . When Burgess was sober he was charming, jolly, and a magnificent talker. 
When he was drunk, he drooled foolish nonsense. He was a kind man, and despite his 
weaknesses, I don’t think he could do anything dishonourable or mean. But he was so terribly 
impetuous’.137 
 
You don’t want to betray if you belong. It is all relative, but Burgess never felt he belonged. 
He was the outsider. At Lockers Park the fathers seemed more distinguished, at Eton he 
resented his failure to make Pop, at Cambridge the Etonians didn’t want anything to do with 
him, in the Foreign Office he wasn’t taken as seriously as he would have liked. Small slights 
grew into larger resentments and betrayal was an easy revenge. Espionage was simply 
another instrument in his social revolt, another gesture of self-assertion. 
 
His homosexuality could have been a factor in feeling an outsider, but it strangely wasn’t, 
because on that score he felt no sense of shame. Robert Cecil, who knew him, noticed, ‘He 
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had no particular wish to change the law on homosexuality; so long as he succeeded in 
defying it, the risk involved gave an added frisson to his exploits’.138 And frisson was part of 
the attraction of first communism and then his spying, which, as one newspaper put it, provided 
‘a gesture of rebellion, an intellectual excitement; an outlet for his sense of adventure and 
love of mischief’.139 
 
Spies have to be good liars and even fantasists, not least for self-protection, but for Burgess 
deceit was integral to his life, from his sexual activities to his political allegiances. As 
Andrew Boyle noted, ‘Truth for Guy would always be a moving target, but the ability to 
dazzle friends and casual acquaintances with the lurid glare of his fantasies consistently 
prevented them from finding him out’.140 
 
Guy Burgess sought power and realising he was unable to achieve that overtly, he chose to do 
so covertly. He enjoyed intrigue and secrets for they were his currency in exerting power and 
controlling people. Goronwy Rees recalled, ‘He liked to know, or pretend to know, what no 
one else knew, he liked to surprise one with information about matters that were no concern 
of his, derived from sources which he could not, or would not, reveal; the trouble was that 
one could never be sure whether the ultimate source was not his own imagination’.141 
 
There was, too, a moral vacuum. His BBC colleague John Green remembered, ‘He had 
literally no principles at all. None at all . . .’142 For Steven Runciman, ‘It was a wasted life. 
There was a solid core missing . . . épater le bourgeois. That’s what really started him off’.143 
 
Burgess would, of course, not have seen his life as one of failure, hypocrisy and deceit. Just as his 
Huguenot ancestors had chosen to start a new life abroad, he too had put his political principles 
ahead of his personal wishes. He did not see himself as having betrayed his country, but as a 
Soviet agent who had nobly served his adopted country. And yet, at the final reckoning, it was 
to his childhood home that Stalin’s Englishman wanted to be taken. 
 
Len Scott has written ‘The professional and public responsibility of academics who study 
intelligence is to foster greater understanding of the nature and role of intelligence, including 
not only its value but its limitations. These include understanding the limitations of our 
knowledge of what is done in secrecy by our governments’.144 
 
I hope I have achieved this with Stalin’s Englishman which broke new ground by 
demonstrating that rather than being the tragic-comic, drunken clown in the group Burgess 
was regarded by his colleagues and the Russians as the leader of the group and the most 
important of the ring.  
 
It showed that whilst Philby was the first to be recruited and Burgess only the third, it was 
Burgess who acted as the chief talent spotter bringing in Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross and 
the recruits from Oxford such as Goronwy Rees. Burgess was the first to be recruited to 
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British Intelligence in 1936/37 and the only one to work for both MI6 and M15. It was he 
who helped engineer the entry of Philby into MI6 in the summer of 1940 and it was Burgess 
who sustained the Ring during the 1930s when the recruits were separated from their 
controllers. 
 
One of his Russian controllers Yuri Modin was later to write that ‘the real leader was 
Burgess. He held the group together, infused it with his energy and led it into battle, so to 
speak. In the 1930s, at the very start, it was he who took the initiatives and the risks, dragging 
the others along in his wake. He was the moral leader of the group’, adding, ‘He was the most 
outstanding and educated among all the five.’145  Sergei Kondrashev, a KGB general who 
worked with Burgess on disinformation measures in Moscow, agreed. Asked who was the 
most important of the Cambridge Spies, he immediately replied, ‘Burgess. Definitely.’146 
 
It’s been assumed that Burgess’s most damaging period was the four years he spent in the 
inner sanctum of the Foreign Office, as private secretary to the deputy Foreign Secretary, 
Hector McNeil, but Kondrashev revealed that in Russian eyes, ‘One of the most important 
periods of his service was just before the German War’ when Burgess was acting as 
middleman between the British and French in the crucial days immediately preceding the 
Second World War’.147 Reporting to MI6 officer David Footman, Burgess used his friendship 
with Edward Pfeifer, secretary to Edward Daladier, to obtain details of French Cabinet 
discussions. It’s a view shared by respected spy writer, Nigel West. ‘Anthony told me that 
Guy Burgess was the genius in the network, the key man. He was the person everybody had 
to go to for instruction, help and advice. Guy was always in touch with the Russians and 
could make decisions and could counsel other people’.10 
 
Stalin’s Englishman also confirmed the escape route of the two men in May 1951, one of the 
mysteries of the story. Over the years, numerous suggestions had been put forward ranging 
from using the same route as Melinda a few years later through the Soviet zone of Austria 148 
to their exfiltration by Russian ship from Bordeaux via Copenhagen to Leningrad.149 Burgess 
had told Driberg in 1956 the two men had caught the Paris express from Rennes and taken an 
overnight train to Berne, where they collected visas at the Czech embassy. There they waited 
a week for a flight to take them from Zurich to Prague and then Moscow. An analysis of 
cypher traffic in Guy Liddell’s diary shows an increase in traffic from Berne about 28th May 
and from Prague about 4th June suggesting Burgess’s account was broadly accurate.150 
 
Stalin’s Englishman also confirmed the existence of another atomic energy spy Wilfrid 
Mann. Mann, a scientist responsible for atomic energy intelligence, worked next door to 
Maclean, Burgess and Philby in the British Embassy in the period 1943-1951. In his memoirs 
he writes of his friendship with all three men and gives a particularly vivid account of the 
famous 1951 dinner party at the Philby house where Burgess managed to insult the guests - 
all top American intelligence officials. 
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Mann had been named before.  Andrew Boyle, whose The Climate of Treason led to the 
exposure of Antony Blunt in 1979, called Mann ‘Basil’ in his book and named him as having 
worked for the Russians. Citing confidential information from a CIA source, Boyle 
claimed  the Israelis ‘passed on to  Angleton the name of the British nuclear scientist whom 
they had unearthed as an important Soviet agent’ just after the Second World War as ‘the 
price for uninterrupted but informal cooperation with US intelligence’.151 
 
Angleton decided to ‘run the operation out of his hip pocket for at least a couple of 
years…Whether Hoover himself was fully informed is questionable. What can be said is that 
the FBI did learn eventually that ‘Basil’ was working under CIA control as a double agent. It 
is impossible to be more precise than this because no complete chronological record of the 
operation was kept; next to nothing was committed to paper – or to the supposed hierarchical 
order of the US Intelligence community’.152 In the book, Boyle argued Mann was used to 
help Maclean interpret for the Soviets information on the latest developments in nuclear 
physics, which without Basil's help would have been Greek to Maclean. 
 
According to Boyle, quite separately in late 1948 American crypto-analysis revealed a 
Russian source inside the British Embassy who had passed classified information during the 
final stages of the Second World War. ‘Basil’ was identified and ‘broke down quickly and 
easily, confessing that he had become a covert Communist in his student days and a secret 
agent for the Soviets not long afterwards’.153 He was given the choice of continuing to work 
for the Russians under CIA direction, or ‘take whatever penalties were visited on him by 
American law’.154 In return for protection and the promise of American citizenship, ‘Basil’ 
agreed to be played back against the Russians providing Maclean only with useless or wrong 
information for passing on to the Soviets.  
 
Though Boyle did not name Mann, he was easily identified – his second name was Basil - 
and questions were asked in the House of Commons. Mann denied the accusations, 
publishing a book in 1982 Was There A Fifth Man? challenging some of the evidence that 
Boyle had produced.155 However, there were inconsistencies in his statements at the time, not 
least claiming not to know Maclean and to having joined the British Embassy in 1949 after 
Maclean had left when in fact he had joined in 1948. Boyle refused to apologise for the 
alleged libel and Angleton to provide testimony when Mann wanted to sue. The matter was 
dropped.  
 
Boyle’s account is supported by former US intelligence officer William Corson in his history 
of the Washington intelligence community The Armies of Ignorance. He wrote that Israeli 
intelligence had provided ‘some remarkable results and intelligence coups’ and that Burgess, 
Maclean and Philby were identified earlier than 1951 and manipulated giving them 
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I uncovered confirmation of Mann’s spying in the private papers of Sir Patrick Reilly, Chair 
of the Joint Intelligence Committee and then the Foreign Office Under-Secretary in charge of 
intelligence at the time of Burgess’s defection in 1951. Reilly wrote in his unpublished 
memoirs ‘That ‘Basil’ who can easily be identified, was in fact a Soviet spy is true: and also 
that he was turned round without difficulty’.157 
 
Wilfrid Mann was born in London in 1908 and educated at St Paul’s school before going on 
to receive a degree in maths and physics from Imperial College in 1929 and a physics 
doctorate in 1934. He went on to do graduate work during the 1930s in Denmark under Niels 
Bohr and to work on cyclotrons at the radiation laboratory at Berkeley, California and in 
1941 he invented the ‘Jitterbug’, the prototype uranium separation machine 
 
At Imperial he had come under the influence of GP Thompson, the British physicist in charge 
of the Tube Alloys project - the British nuclear programme, later incorporated into the joint 
British and American Manhattan Project - and went to work for it first at Shell Mex House in 
the Strand and then from 1942 at the British Commonwealth Scientific Office in Washington 
as the supervisor in British and Russian scientific co-operation. 
 
After a short period with the British nuclear programme at  Chalk River in Canada,  he 
returned to Washington as a member of MI6  reporting to Commander Eric Welsh, the chief 
of MI6’s scientific intelligence service, where both he and Donald Maclean attended  the 
Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Energy. As the British scientific intelligence liaison 
officer, he maintained close relations with the CIA’s James Angleton. Mann‘s office was in 
the ‘Rogues Gallery’, the secure area of the Embassy, and next door to those of Philby and 
Burgess. Here he held the British decrypts of Soviet signals traffic relating to atomic bomb 
experiments, decrypts he shared with the CIA – and it appears the KGB. 
 
Confirmation of Donald Maclean’s treachery came from intercepted Soviet communications 
in April 1951 and coincidentally on the 25th of that month Mann was replaced by Dr Robert 
Press as the MI6 scientific intelligence officer. He was never employed by the British again, 
subsequently working from 1951 to 1980 as head of the radioactivity section at the National 
Bureau of Standards in Washington. Mann, who became an American citizen in 1959, 
declined all interview requests and died in a Baptist retirement home in Baltimore in March 
2001. In spite of his wartime scientific contributions in both the UK and the US, he received 
no obituaries. 
 
My discovery backs up Ultimate Deception: How Stalin Stole the Bomb, by Jerry Dan (real 
name Nigel Bance), a book based on interviews with a KGB officer Vladimir Barkovsky, 
formerly deputy director of the department within the KGB which handled all scientific and 
technical intelligence and KGB documents, which revealed Mann to have been recruited  - 
possibly through homosexual blackmail - in the late 1930s and given the codename 
MALONE because of his Irish connections.158 Interviewed for the book, Mann confirmed to 
Dan that he had been a Russian spy.159 
 
According to Ultimate Deception, Mann was in regular contact  during and immediately after 
the Second World War with Russian intelligence officers and KGB officers confirm he was a 
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Soviet agent of great influence – ‘rated in Moscow as equal to Philby in importance’.160 He 
supposedly passed to his Russian case officer the precise details of British cooperation with 
the United States on atomic matters, revealed that Britain had given up the right of veto on 
the dropping of an atomic bomb and accepted that two-thirds of all uranium oxide mined in 
the Belgian Congo and South Africa should go through American ports.161 
 
Other documents he supplied – reproduced in the book -  included a  transmission  dated 23rd 
August 1945 ‘Report of NKGB resident in London on the intensification of activities of 
British Intelligence against the USSR’ telling Moscow that the British and French were about 
to establish the ‘Anglo-French Liaison Bureau’, a secret MI6 bureau in Paris to monitor 
Soviet atomic developments. On a trip to London in February 1948 he gave the rezidentura 
the technical details of a fleet of adapted long-range US bombers on constant alert in the 
north Pacific to check the fallout from any Russian nuclear explosion. 
 
According to Ultimate Deception, the Russians never entirely trusted Mann and suspected - 
rightly so - that he was being ‘played back’ to them. The discovery of Reilly’s account of 
‘Basil’ appears to confirm that the Mann accusations were correct though how Mann was 
used is not clear.  
 
Those who defend Mann say his name does not appear in Guy Liddell's diary, the Venona 
decrypts nor the Mitrokhin Archive, that he was several times security cleared and his FBI 
file is not designated R for Russian espionage. They believe Angleton misled Boyle to protect 
his own reputation over Philby. However, the fact Mann’s name has not cropped up in 
Liddell, Venona and Mitrokhin does not necessarily mean he did not spy for the Russians but 
simply there is no record. He could, for example, have been run by Russian military 
intelligence, the GRU, or outside the rezidentura. The spy writer Nigel West claims that in 
2003 documents were retrieved from the KGB archive suggesting 'that Mann may have been 
a Soviet spy codenamed MALLONE'. 162 
   
MI5,  when I approached them , claimed they ‘hold no files relating to Wilfrid Mann that fall 
within this category’ ie ‘files that are still in existence and at least 50 years old, if to do so 
would not damage national security’.163 The CIA, in response to a Freedom of Information 
request, wrote they could ‘neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records 




How much damage did Guy Burgess inflict 
 
 
One of the important debates in intelligence studies is contextualising intelligence, the need 
not just to give details of intelligence operations but to assess their impact and broader 
importance. A critique is that much of intelligence history is ‘military buffism’. As John 
Lewis Gaddis has written:  
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As great stacks of books that have been written about the history of espionage amply 
demonstrate, it is easy to get so caught up in the fascination of esoteric minutiae that 
one loses sight of what, if anything, it all meant. What difference did it make that the 
Russians spied on their Anglo-American allies throughout the war, that they knew 
much of what went on within the British and American governments during the early 
post-war years and that London and Washington failed to discover this until 1951? Is 
the world today – was the world then – discernibly different as a result?164 
 
He has argued that intelligence is always filtered so ‘someone must decide what information 
to obtain or intercept, what to transmit or decipher, and finally what to incorporate within the 
necessary laconic analyses that go to those few on the receiving end who have the authority 
to act. For these reasons alone, an intelligence breakthrough is likely to provide less accurate 
information than one might expect: one need only cite the ineffectiveness of MAGIC in 
anticipating Pearl Harbour, or of ULTRA in warning of Hitler’s 1944 attack in the Ardennes, 
to make the point. The difficulty is likely to be compounded when decision makers distrust 
the source of such information. We know, for example, that Stalin dismissed American and 
British warnings of a German attack in June 1941 because he was convinced the West was 
trying to use disinformation to undermine Soviet-German relations’.165 
 
He goes on: 
 
Any comprehensive assessment of the impact of Soviet espionage on post-war 
diplomacy will have to give attention to the particular characteristics of its primary 
consumer, and to the question – fundamental to an understanding of Stalin – of 
whether he ever overcame the fear of being fooled sufficiently to be able to act on the 
basis of information being conveyed to through sources he could not completely 
control.166  
 
And even if Stalin trusted his sources, he says, did any of the information provided by the 
spies change history?  
 
The British spies would have been in a position, as well, to convey information about 
American efforts in 1949-50 to bring about a break with the Chinese Communists  
and the Russians, and about plans – or the lack of them – for the defence of Korea. 
And once the Korean War began, of course, there would have been ample 
opportunities to inform the Russians of evolving Anglo-American strategy for 
countering North Korean and Chinese military operations. But so what? What 
difference did this all make?167 
 
He concludes in a call for greater rigour in intelligence studies that ‘good intelligence history 
will have to be more than an accumulation of “spy stories”: it will have to try and answer 
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Robin Winks’s “So what?” question; it will have to try to distinguish between “necessary” 
and “sufficient” causation.; and it will have to show how what governments actually did 
relates to what they did, or did not, actually know’.168 
 
Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, reviewing 
Christopher Andrew’s The Secret World: A History of Intelligence, whilst admitting 
‘Intelligence studies have at last become a respectable academic discipline’169, felt that 
Andrew ‘does not quite engage with the broader questions he himself raises. How much 
influence did intelligence really have on the course of history? How much do you distort the 
historical record if you omit the secret world?’170 If a Cambridge Professor of History 
struggles with such links, what hope for a doctoral student at Edinburgh? 
 
It is a view shared by John Ferris who has argued ‘Students of intelligence should aim not 
just to astonish their audience, but to bore them, and always to answer the key questions - 
why and how did intelligence really matter?’171 This is easier said than done. Intelligence is 
like advertising. Only a small part is effective but it is sometimes difficult to establish which 
part. It is, however, possible. One thinks of Ralph Bennett’s books on Ultra172 which 
specifically showed how Ultra shaped certain events and why during World War Two, Calder 
Walton’s Empires of Secrets on British intelligence and de-colonisation or James Barr’s  
Lords of the Desert on British intelligence in the Middle East. 
Writing about Burgess’s fellow spy Donald Maclean in 2002, Sheila Kerr admitted some of 
the challenges in determining the importance of some agents: 
 
While we know that Maclean was a Soviet agent, some 50 years after his defection to 
Moscow we still do not know the true cost of his betrayal. Incomplete, ambiguous and 
misleading evidence prevents a full and accurate assessment. Speculations, 
hypotheses and conspiracies turn the evidence into a tangle. The intellectual challenge 
begins by distinguishing between these different strands of evidence and opinion, 
trying to find the origin of particular stories, and then separating fact from fiction, 
information from disinformation….we remain some distance from being able to make 
accurate, comprehensive judgements about the significance of intelligence in 
international history.173 
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She argued that ‘intelligence history’s key contribution lies in its power to alter previous 
causal explanations…If intelligence history alters our explanations about causation then it has 
the power to alter our understanding of the relationship between cause and effect as well as 
altering the ultimate significance of events and their consequences’.174 This is clearly what 
happened with the books on Ultra which completely changed scholars’ view of the Second 
World War. 
 
With regard to Maclean, she also makes the point of perspective in assessing the success of a 
spy: 
 
For the Soviets, Maclean was a hero of the revolution. British and American opinion 
is mixed. Some left wing idealists admire Maclean for his ideological commitment to 
communism regardless of the cost. Others regard the whole business as 
inconsequential, taking the view that the intelligence Cold War was an amoral and 
meaningless struggle without heroes or villains. Most people see Maclean as a 
damaging traitor who caused deep distress in the Anglo-American relationship.175 
 
Establishing how much damage Burgess inflicted is not easy. We know some of the material 
that Burgess passed to the Russians, and that it was so extensive that much of it was never 
even translated – the Russian agent Kislytsin talked about Burgess bringing out suitcases of 
documents and at one point Burgess requested he be supplied with an extra suitcase. But we 
know only what the Russians have chosen to share in authorised books such as Deadly 
Illusions and The Crown Jewels, fascinating accounts but ones which have to be treated 
carefully as the Russian authorities often had another agenda. There are certainly still shelves 
of material on the Cambridge Spy Ring in both Russian and British archives that have not 
been released and which might well provide a new narrative.  
 
What we do know, according to The Crown Jewels, is that from 1941 to 1945 Burgess passed 
4,604 documents to Moscow Centre. These documents included, amongst much else, 
telegraphic communications between the Foreign Office and its posts abroad, position papers 
and minutes of the Cabinet and Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff. However, even when we 
know what documentation was taken, we don’t know who saw it, when, and what they did 
with the material.  Donald Cameron Watt agrees that: 
 
To arrive at an assessment of the impact of clandestinely obtained information on 
Soviet policy is more difficult. Even where one can assume accuracy of frequency of 
reports, the circulation and evaluation of such reports within the Soviet military and 
political hierarchy is difficult to reconstruct. We simply do not know how the reports 
of the GRU and the NKVD were circulated or evaluated.176 
 
The irony with Burgess is that the more explosive the material, the less likely it was to be 
trusted, as Stalin and his cohorts couldn’t believe that it wasn’t a plant. Also if it didn’t fit in 
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with Soviet assumptions, then it was ignored. Much of the material Burgess supplied, out of 
practical necessity for security reasons, was oral briefing, which could easily be 
misinterpreted as it was passed on. The extraordinary amount of intelligence supplied by the 
Cambridge Five rather than pleasing the Centre only fed into their paranoia.  
 
A young intelligence officer, Elena Modrzhinskaya, was asked to evaluate the information 
provided and determine its reliability. She knew through Blunt of the Double Cross system, 
whereby Britain had played back agents against Germany, and concluded by November 1942 
that a similar deception was being undertaken against the Soviet Union by the Five acting as 
double agents. How possibly, given their communist past, could the Cambridge Spy Ring 
have been allowed to work for British Intelligence? The only conclusion she could come to 
was ‘that SÖNCHEN and MADCHEN, even before their contact with us, were sent by the 
British Intelligence Services to work among students with left-wing sympathies in 
Cambridge’.177 
 
The Centre couldn’t believe the Five’s access and how much secret material was being 
supplied, nor could they believe that British intelligence were not targeting the Soviet 
Union. ‘Not a single valuable British agent in the USSR or in the Soviet embassy in Britain 
has been exposed with the help of this group, in spite of the fact that if they had been sincere 
in their co-operation they could easily have done’, one report noted.178 The explanation was 
much simpler. The Foreign Office had banned covert activity against Britain’s new ally, and 
all intelligence energies were being focused against Nazi Germany and winning the war. 
There were no secret agents to report. 
 
So suspicious was Moscow Centre about their star agents that the London residency was 
ordered to create a separate independent agent network. An eight-man surveillance team, 
none of whom spoke English and all dressed in conspicuously Russian clothes, was sent to 
try and catch the Cambridge Spies meeting their non-existent MI5 case officers. Failing to 
discover any such contact, the surveillance team simply reported various innocent visitors to 
the Soviet embassy in London as suspected MI5 agents provocateurs.179 
 
What could Burgess have passed to the Russians? Clearly anything he drafted himself, but 
also anything that came across his desk or he asked to see. In particular, as Hector McNeil’s 
private secretary and as a Far East expert, he would have seen very important and secret 
documents, especially crucial during the Four Powers conferences, when the British 
negotiating position would have been known to the Soviets during the conferences 
themselves. He was known to work late and at weekends and had access to secret safes, but 
even plain texts of enciphered cables were useful for code-breaking efforts. We can certainly 
surmise that he passed across information about the post-war peace conferences and founding 
meetings of the United Nations, NATO and OECD, plans for the reconstruction of post-war 
Germany and the immediate negotiating positions at conferences such as that creating the 
Brussels Treaty. 
 
An indication of the quality of intelligence Burgess supplied can be seen in Harold 
Nicolson’s diary entries. In February 1945 he wrote, ‘I dine with Guy Burgess, who shows 
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me the telegrams exchanged with Moscow. It is clear that the Ambassadors’ Commission is 
not to be a farce in the least’.180 The Commission, which consisted of the Soviet foreign 
minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the British and American ambassadors in Moscow, was to 
settle the composition of the new Polish Provisional government. It’s clear from the fact that 
Nicolson saw them that Burgess had access to Foreign Office cables between London and the 
Moscow embassy, and was able to remove them and pass them to Moscow, allowing 
Molotov to be well-briefed in negotiations. On 4 March, Burgess’s Soviet handler Boris 
Kreshin, ‘Bob’, reported he had brought several Foreign Office telegrams and ‘had also 
written an agent’s report on the procedural conduct of debates in parliament on the Polish 
question’.181 
 
The material he was supplying was dynamite. The report of the meeting of 4 March listed 
amongst much else: telegrams on the San Francisco Conference the following month that set 
up the United Nations, and the British position on the division of Germany, which went 
against what the American delegation had proposed at the Yalta Conference a few months 
before. A May 1945 Chiefs of Staff report for General Ismay, which set out plans for war 
between the British Empire and Soviet Union – Operation Unthinkable – was passed to 
Moscow, probably by Burgess. The report accepted a three-to-one superiority of Soviet land 
forces in Europe and the Middle East, where the conflict was projected to take place, but did 
nothing to allay Russian suspicions that the wartime alliance was clearly over.182 
 
Appointment as personal assistant to the Minister of State at the Foreign Office  had brought 
Burgess to the heart of the British government at a crucial juncture in twentieth-century 
history, giving him access to almost all papers that came to the Foreign Office ministers, 
including the minutes of meetings of the Cabinet, the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of 
the Imperial General Staff, and the positions of Western countries on the post-war settlement 
in Europe and Britain’s military strategy. He also took advantage of the daily afternoon tea 
party in the ambassadors’ waiting room, fifty yards from McNeil’s office, to pick up all the 
latest gossip and expand his network of contacts. 
 
Within days of taking up his post, Burgess had supplied two documents from the Russia 
Committee, a Foreign Office committee that dealt with all aspects of policy towards Russia. 
It reported that Bevin and the Cabinet were about to decide ‘whether to extend Great 
Britain’s present hostile relations with the governments of the countries which he calls Soviet 
satellites (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania), and whether Great Britain should maintain its present 
policy of support for the opposition, or whether the time has come to recognise Soviet 
influence and cease the fight against it’.183 Further documents followed, including various 
ministerial minutes on German post-war political and economic reconstruction, notably from 
the Overseas Reconstruction Committee, chaired by Ernest Bevin. 
 
In December 1947 Burgess attended with McNeil the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 
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London with delegates from the United States, Soviet Union and France, where again the 
future of Germany was discussed. During the period from 6 November to 11 December, he 
passed across more than three hundred documents to his Russian contacts. 
 
In November 1948 Burgess started in the Far East Department. The diplomat and writer 
Robert Cecil has suggested it’s possible ‘that Burgess’s arguments contributed in some 
degree to the recommendation made by Ernest Bevin, and accepted by Attlee’s Cabinet in 
December 1948, in favour of de facto relations with the PRC’.184 This is an exaggeration, as 
Burgess had only just joined the department as its most junior member a month before, but 
his position did allow him to keep Moscow informed on the formulation of British policy on 
the People’s Republic of China, founded in October 1949, and towards Korea, right through 
until the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950. 
 
Among the documents he saw in April 1949 was a CIA report, ‘Prospects for Soviet Control 
of a Communist China’, arguing that any pledge that Chinese communists would like 
foreigners to continue business as usual was only a feint to secure recognition of the regime 
change and minimise foreign opposition. Burgess was inclined to agree and duly added the 
briefing to his suitcase. 
 
On 29 April 1949 he saw the Joint Intelligence Committee’s views on the nature of Russian 
air assistance to China. The secret reports listed: 
 
by name, in some cases, Soviet military personnel drafted into China after the 
revolution, the weapons they brought with them . . . the airfields they were 
constructing, and the training they were providing to Mao’s forces. Such intimate 
knowledge of how much Western intelligence knew on the military side would have 
been prized in Moscow in the months before the outbreak of the Korean War.185 
 
However the October 2015 release of Burgess files suggests that some of the accusations 
levelled against Burgess with regard to the Korean War are exaggerated. It was openly 
discussed that Western Forces would not counter attack beyond the Yalu River and MI5 
officer Graham Mitchell told his American intelligence counterpart ‘There is no evidence 
whatsoever to show that Burgess or Maclean passed on any information about the Korean 
War to the Russians or the Chinese or to anyone else’. 186 
 
In August 1949, the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee produced two long papers 
assessing the prospects for regional collaboration in the Far East. It concluded that the modest 
British military resources made direct intervention in an anti-communist struggle impossible 
and that the defence of Southeast Asia was down to the region itself. The PUSC papers were 
passed to Burgess to send on to Nanking, but went missing. The admission of British 
reluctance to intervene must have been valuable to the Russians.187 
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Burgess’s effectiveness should not just be measured in the quality and quantity of documents 
passed over. Sheila Kerr makes the point in her case study of Maclean that: 
 
significantly there is only one other reference to Maclean being an agent of influence 
when he was at the British Embassy in Cairo. All other works focus on Maclean’s 
espionage, ignoring the importance of subversion, influence operations and diversion 
in Soviet intelligence doctrine. This is a sharp reminder of how a key question went 
unanswered and was then forgotten - an important and regrettable omission because 
Soviet intelligence doctrine regards influence operations as the most powerful tool of 
intelligence. Ideological agents were first and foremost agents of influence and they 
could also engage in espionage depending upon their circumstances.188 
 
Burgess was certainly an agent of influence, most notably in the BBC and during his time 
on Far East affairs, where he helped shape British policy to recognise Communist China 
when America refused to, but also later in Moscow working on Soviet disinformation.  
 
In assessing the damage he caused it’s also worth considering Burgess’s role as a recruiter, 
something that academics such as John Lewis Gaddis forget. What about all the agents he 
was responsible for recruiting – Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Michael Straight – and 
the agents they in turn recruited and all the information they supplied to the Russians? And 
these are just the agents we know about. 
 
Burgess was also a magnificent manipulator of people and trader in gossip. He was highly 
social and almost always out at dinners and night clubs – usually paid for on expenses or by 
others. In the Foreign Office, he is remembered for always popping in and out of other 
people’s offices. He knew how to extract material through charm, provocation, his own 
powers of argument and knowledge and, when required, blackmail. Here was a man who 
supposedly kept every love letter in case it could be useful and who was happy to lend his flat 
for assignations. People liked him and confided in him and Burgess took every advantage.  
 
As Goronwy Rees noted: 
 
Guy possessed an appalling fund of information to the discredit of numerous persons 
in this country. Collecting it was one of his private hobbies; it was a native instinct in 
him and it was done primarily, I think, for purposes of gossip and private amusement; 
but I believe . . .it constitutes a formidable weapon of pressure and blackmail.189  
 
Tom Wylie, Dennis Proctor and Fred Warner may not have been Soviet agents, but they 
might as well have been as they showed Burgess the interesting papers that crossed their 
desk. One can only speculate at the information he may have gleaned from his friends in 
intelligence, Guy Liddell and David Footman, on their weekly visits to the music hall. And 
there was always the excuse at various moments that Burgess was working in the cause of 
anti-fascism, that Russia were our allies, or it was for some hush-hush British organisation. 
 
Apart from actual documents, he could provide lists of agents when he worked for MI6 and 
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MI5, he could interpret policy and human nature, and he could provide insights into character 
that might allow others to exert pressure on a particular individual. Rees later wrote: 
 
The very existence of a secret service was for Guy a challenge to curiosity and certainly 
he showed a persistent determination to penetrate its secrets which had nothing to do 
with his official duties. It is quite certain that during the period after the war, both in 
London and in Washington, he acquired a remarkable knowledge for one in his position, 
both of the personalities and of the working of the security services . . . What is difficult 
to exaggerate is the amount of information which he had acquired about the machinery 
and methods of our security services, their organisation, and the names and positions of 
those who worked in them.190 
Indeed the very word ‘secret’ was like a call to battle for Burgess, a challenge that he never 
failed to accept; he hunted out secrets like a hound after truffles. These elements, ignored in 
the Gaddis debate, need to be taken into account. 
 
One of the most damaging legacies was the defection itself, which undermined Anglo-
American intelligence co-operation at least until 1955. Tim Marten, a First Secretary dealing 
with Atomic Energy in the Embassy in Washington , set out the situation for his boss Roger 
Makins on 20 June 1951, saying that while the Atomic Energy Commission and State 
Department were still open to co-operation, the CIA and Defence were not. ‘The one gleam of 
hope is that Bedell Smith and the Department of Defence may be prepared to reverse their 
present attitude of opposition, if some solution of the Maclean-Burgess affair is found which is 
not damaging to the reputation of British security’. 191 In fact, as a senior MI6 officer at the 
time, with close ties to the Americans, later admitted, ‘The B&M defection caused a terrible 
rift between us and American intelligence, and at the time they simply clamped down and 
stopped giving us anything’.192 
 
The suspicion that Burgess and Maclean had been protected before their defection and the 
subsequent cover up – the White Paper on the case was called ‘The Whitewash Paper’ - 
shook public respect for the institutions of government, including Parliament and the Foreign 
Office.193 The Burgess and Maclean case also bequeathed a culture of suspicion and mistrust 
within the Security Services that was still being played out half a century after the 1951 flight 
and may have proved more debilitating to British Intelligence than the original acts of 
espionage. What it did not lead to, as is sometimes claimed, was a witch hunt against 
homosexuals as with the Lavender Scare in America. 194 In fact, proceedings for ‘queer 
incidents’ at the Metropolitan Magistrates Courts between 1947 and 1952 fell from 637 to 
583 incidents.195 
 
An immediate consequence of the Burgess and Maclean case was the setting up of a 
Committee under Sir Alexander Cadogan to look at how similar scandals might be prevented 
in future. Set up on 7th July 1951, it met first on 3rd November 1951. Dominated by members 
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of the Foreign Office, it took no submissions from the Civil Service Commission which did 
the recruitment, nor any psychologists, nor anyone connected with personnel in industry or 
the armed forces.  
 
It further strengthened positive vetting, which had begun already in early 1951. Previously, 
candidates had been checked to establish if there was anything negative against them in the 
files. Now it required all civil servants who had ‘regular and constant access to the most 
highly classified defence information’ and those who had ‘access to the more highly 
classified categories of atomic energy information’ to submit to positive vetting. About one 
hundred and twenty-five Foreign Office posts were so designated and had been checked by 
November. The loophole was that it didn’t cover people who didn’t have ‘regular and 
constant’ access. It was an improvement and required all the relevant departments to set up 
their own security departments to carry out the vetting – though the Admiralty didn’t do so 
until 1961 – but there were still no background checks.196 
 
It suggested that if a person brought discredit on the Foreign Office, whether homosexual or 
heterosexual, then they would have to resign. Even if there was no scandal, the person should 
be watched and any appointments taken into account, because of the risk of blackmail. The 
system of confidential reporting by heads of mission on their staff was improved, though the 
committee understood the reluctance of colleagues to ‘blab’ about each other. It was a start, 
but it required huge resources to administer. Guy Liddell of MI5 noted in December, ‘We are 
now vetting something like 5,000 cases a week.’197 
 
These are all elements of the intelligence story worth studying but which are often forgotten 
by placing too much consequence on the repercussions in terms of international relations. We 
may not be able to totally assess the damage Burgess caused in terms of power politics but 
we can, through media coverage, look at the impact of his case  in terms of public opinion, 
diminishing faith in institutions, changing recruitment and vetting systems for government 
jobs and even attitudes to homosexuality. Gaddis argues that history only matters if we know 
what the impact of what certain events were, how history was changed by events. That may 
be what interests him but it may not be important to others. Why a person became a traitor 
and why they were not suspected for many years is as legitimate a study for the intelligence 
historian as the impact of that spy’s treachery. Indeed, history doesn’t even need to reach a 
conclusion. Going for a historical walk observing things on the way can be of sufficient 









Intelligence biography is now an important element within intelligence studies allowing a 
more focussed study of treachery and its consequences. There has recently been a flurry of 
biographies of SOE figures with the opening of the SOE files and as more documents, 
especially personal case files, are released, in particular, to the National Archives the number 
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of intelligence biographies will grow. But even with a programme of document releases, the 
challenges for intelligence historians remain. Intelligence personnel are still reluctant to talk 
because of the legal penalties. Stronger privacy laws make disclosure in books more difficult 
and many files remain closed. We live in an era of ‘fake news’ where no information can be 
fully trusted and where governments manipulate and curate our history. The Freedom of 
Information has not brought the transparency and anticipated release of documents as was 
hoped. Archives going back over a hundred years remain closed and blanket exemptions are 
still the norm. 
 
It is important governments realise their responsibility to the past and ensure all but the most 
sensitive files are released. Until a Public Interest test can be brought to bear on all historical 
documents, greater power, independence (it is under the control of the Cabinet Office the 
worst offender for FOIA breaches) and resources given to the Information Commissioner and 
Advisory Council on National Records and Archives and more resources devoted to the 
release rather than suppression of historical documents then it is going to be difficult to fill 
the gap of this missing dimension in our recent history. 
 
The balance between accountability, transparency and open government and protecting 
national security is a difficult one to strike. Once records are released the genie is out of the 
bottle but it is hard to argue that records, which in many cases are over 60 years old and 
where the officials involved are dead, should not be released. If our history is to be written 
accurately, we will have to have all the records made available – not just those a government 
department believes we should have. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from Stalin’s Englishman? First that Guy Burgess was a 
much more damaging spy than hitherto realised, not just in his access to intelligence and 
documents with the intelligence services and government but also in his role as an agent of 
influence and recruiter.  
 
Second Burgess’s role in various departments should provide new leads for scholars in other 
academic areas of study. His work as a propagandist for the British in the Ministry of 
Information, News Department and Information Research Department and for the Soviet 
Union especially during his exile in the Soviet Union establishes new information for 
scholars of the black arts.  His role as a courier immediately before World War Two should 
produce a new element for diplomatic historians studying the origins of the Second World 
War and especially the Nazi-Soviet Pact whilst his time in the Far East Department should be 
of interest to those studying the Korean War. 
 
New light has been shed in Stalin’s Englishman on some of the controversies surrounding his 
life, such as his escape route to the Soviet Union in 1951, the ramifications of the defection to 
Anglo-American intelligence cooperation and the role played by other members of the 
Cambridge Ring, by other spies, such as Michael Straight and Alister Watson, or fellow 
travellers such as Dennis Proctor. The baton is there to be picked up by scholars, for example, 
to discover more about Wilfrid Mann, one of the new spies revealed by Stalin’s Englishman 
and how far the Burgess and Maclean case changed government and public attitudes to 
homosexuality and the pace of homosexual de-criminalisation.  
 
A study of Burgess not only gives new insights into the dynamics and importance of The 
Cambridge Spy Ring but it has revelations about British institutions of the period and the way 
they first failed to uncover Burgess clandestine activities and then, concerned not to create a 
British McCarthyite witch hunt and jeopardise Anglo-American intelligence and atomic co-
operation, they attempted to downplay the extent of  the treachery. 
 
Thirdly Stalin’s Englishman is a case study in how biography is a useful way of studying 
intelligence, especially traitors, showing the influences which shaped them becoming spies 
and specifically how they operated. Telling the story of intelligence operations or events 
through the prism of a life humanises and makes intelligence much more accessible and it is 
hoped more intelligence historians will embrace the opportunities presented by the 
biographical form.  
 
Intelligence biography should also be helpful for scholars studying the psychology of 
treason198 and for intelligence agencies on targeting potential agents susceptible to 
recruitment and for counter-espionage officers determining those who may have been 
suborned.   
 
Guy Burgess has inspired dozens of dramas and novels most notably Julian Mitchell’s 
Another Country,  Alan Bennett’s An Englishman Abroad,  Robin Chapman’s One of Us, 
Rodney Garland’s The Troubled Midnight, Nicholas Monsarrat’s Smith and Jones , John 
Banville’s The Untouchable and  Michael Dobbs’s Winston’s War .199 This is becoming a 
rich source of study for not only literary and film scholars but also those writing about 
popular culture and in LGBT studies.200 This research will be helped by the new information 
in Stalin’s Englishman.201 
 
It is clear not all the files on Guy Burgess have yet been opened so there should be fresh 
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